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Introduction
Title lending, in which a borrower uses his car title as collateral for a short-term, high-
interest loan, is a growing part of the alternative financial market. These loans provide
credit to a group of American who are not well-served by traditional lenders like banks and
credit card issuers. Despite their growing prevalence, very little is known about the effect
of title loans on customers. In this dissertation, I address several issues in the title lending
market. Critics of these loans claim that they have disastrous consequences for borrowers,
who are often tricked into borrowing more than they want and can afford to repay. Because
of these two factors, critics argue, borrowers continue to borrow more than they want to
and are hurt by the existence of title lending. I examine these claims separately.
In Ch. I, I examine whether receiving a larger loan causes a customer to fall into a debt
spiral, where he continues to borrow from the company because he cannot repay the initial
loan, rather than because of additional liquidity needs. Critics of the loans and consumer
advocates argue that lenders do not take ability to repay into account when making loan
offers, and that they push borrowers to take out more than they can afford. This causes bor-
rowers to be “trapped” by the lender, and to borrow repeatedly in order to make payments
on the initial loan.
To examine this question, I use a novel, administrative dataset from an alternative finan-
cial services provider in Tennessee and institutional features of the title lending industry in
Tennessee to look at the effect of receiving a larger loan on the customer’s future borrow-
ing from the company over the next year. I find that customers who receive a larger loan
do borrow more from the company over the next year, but they do not exhibit increased
difficulty in repaying the initial loan. Together, these results suggest that customers are not
more likely to experience a debt spiral if they receive a larger loan. Instead, I argue, these
results suggest that customers have found a reliable source of credit to which they return
when they experience new liquidity needs. Thus, caps on the size of a title loan, like the
one in Tennessee, may not be the appropriate regulation to address the issue of ability to
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repay the loan.
The second claim of many critics is that the loans are designed to not be repaid and
therefore can lead to disastrous consequences for borrowers who lose their vehicles. If
this claim is true, then it should show up in higher bankruptcy filing rates for people who
have access to title loans. Filing for bankruptcy is a signal of extreme financial distress.
In my second chapter, I use two measures of access to title loans - whether they are legal
in a county, and whether the county is within a certain distance of a state where they are
legal - to examine if residents of counties with access to title lending have higher personal
bankruptcy filing rates than those of counties without access. Contrary to what the critics
claim, counties with access to title loans have lower personal bankruptcy filing rates, par-
ticularly Ch. 7 filing rates. This suggests that the loans, on average, fill a credit gap and
improve financial well-being for consumers. Overall, they do not appear to cause borrowers
to experience extreme financial hardships.
Although the main contention of title lending critics is that the loans have devastating
consequences, it may be that the loans do harm borrowers but not so badly as to push
them into filing for bankruptcy. To look at this possibility, Chapter III examines the effect
of access to title lending on less extreme measures of financial hardship than filing for
bankruptcy. Using the National Survey of America’s Families, I look at whether people
with access to title loans have more trouble paying for medical care or housing related
bills. My results show that households that have access to title lending are not more likely
to experience measures of financial hardship. In fact, access to title lending has no effect
on the measures of financial hardship. This is true across multiple robustness checks.
Together these chapters provide empirical evidence in the debate about title lending.
Receiving a larger loan does not cause customers to be more likely to experience a debt
spiral. Nor do the loans have the devastating consequences that consumer advocates argue
they do. This suggests that outright bans of the loans are not warranted. Future regulation
of the loans should address specific features of the loan that may be harmful to customers.
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CHAPTER I
Do larger subprime loans cause debt spirals? Evidence from the Tennessee auto title
lending market
I.1 Introduction
Small-dollar, high-interest loans are an increasingly important source of credit for millions
of Americans. Early regulation of these loans often took the form of outright bans, but
more recent regulation has involved limiting specific characteristics of the loan, like its size.
Regulators worry that borrowers will be caught in a cycle of debt if they receive a loan that
is too large. Consumer advocates say that lenders are “abusive” (Consumer Federation of
America, 2014) and that borrowers are “driven to disaster” (Fox et al., 2013) by the loans.
There is no research to date, however, on the effect of loan size on a customer’s ability to
repay a loan or on a customer’s future borrowing needs. Because of the prevalence of bans,
research on small-dollar credit has focused only on the effect of obtaining a loan. To my
knowledge, I provide the first estimates of the effect of loan size on future borrowing and
the first work empirically studying the auto title lending market more generally.
The major challenge in determining the effect of loan size on borrower outcomes is
separating the effect of higher overall demand for credit from the supply side effect of
receiving a larger loan. A customer who chooses to borrow more today may also have
more of a need for credit in the future than a similar borrower who chooses a smaller loan.
The differences in demand for credit between these two types of customers will bias upward
the coefficients in simple regressions of loan size on future borrowing. Disentangling these
two effects is necessary to obtain a reliable estimate of the effect of an increase in credit
supply on customer outcomes.
I solve this challenge by looking at the title lending market in Tennessee and using a
unique administrative dataset. A title loan is a 30-day loan in which a borrower uses his
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car title as collateral for a loan with an annualized interest rate as high as 300 percent. In
this market, title lenders make loan offers as a percentage of the customer’s car value, but
Tennessee places a cap of $2,500 on the size of the loans. This legal cap induces a change
in the relationship between car value and loan size. Up to the $2,500 cap on loan size,
there is a one-to-one relationship between the value of the vehicle and the loan offer. After
that cutoff point, any increase in car value does not lead to an increase in loan offer; the
loan offer remains $2,500. This change, or “kink,” in the relationship between car value
and loan offer leads to a kink in the relationship between car value and loan size. I use the
kink to identify an exogenous change in the loan size that is independent of the customer’s
decision of how much to borrow.
I use a detailed administrative dataset from an alternative financial services provider in
Tennessee that includes all the variables that create the kinks as well as several demographic
variables. In my dataset, I observe a customer’s car value, loan offer, chosen loan size, loan
outcomes, and future borrowing, as well as several demographic characteristics for almost
10,000 loans. These rich data allow me to exploit the interaction between the company’s
rules and the statutory cap to measure the effect of receiving a larger loan. Although the
company lends to customers regardless of income, I focus only on moderate-income cus-
tomers: customers with income between $36,000 and $60,000. These borrowers are more
likely to have cars with values that place them near the legal loan size cap, so they are more
likely to actually be affected by any change in the legal cap on loan size.1
Because of this kink in the relationship between car value and loan size, I use a fuzzy
regression kink design. Regression kink design (RKD) is similar to regression discontinuity
design, but uses the change in the slope of the relationship between the running variable
(car value) and the variable of interest (loan size) at a cutoff to study the effect of the
variable of interest (loan size) on the outcome (future borrowing) rather than a jump in the
function. A change in the slope of the conditional expectation function for outcomes at the
1Main results for the other income groups are presented in the online appendix. Additional results are
available upon request.
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same location as the initial change in slope can be interpreted as the causal effect of loan
size on amount borrowed over the next year. Clearly, observed and unobserved covariates
affect the customer’s decision of how much to borrow, and so the size of the kink in the
relationship between car value and loan size must also be estimated.
First, I document that this kink in the relationship between car value and loan size does
exist. If customers were not constrained by the loan offer, then we would see no effect of
the cap on loan size. In fact, there is a clear kink in the relationship between car value and
loan size at the $2,500 cutoff. The slope falls by 0.56 at the cutoff, which provides the
estimate of the size of the kink in the assignment function. Then, to identify the effect of
loan size on future borrowing, I look for a corresponding kink in the conditional expectation
functions for several outcomes at the same cutoff. The kink in the conditional expectation
function is scaled by the first stage kink to provide the causal estimate.
I also provide a measure of the liquidity constraints that these customers face. I find
that customers borrow $0.54 for each additional dollar of credit they are offered. These
estimates are higher than previous results from the general population but in line with
results from credit constrained individuals. In the credit card market, for example, Gross
and Souleles (2002) find that overall, customers borrow $0.10 to $0.14 of a credit line
increase, but customers who have already borrowed 90 percent of their credit line borrow
$0.45 of any increase. Dobbie and Skiba (2013) find that payday loan customers borrow
$0.39 to $0.44 for each additional dollar of credit. My results suggest that title lending
customers may be more constrained than other alternative financial services borrowers.
One benefit of RKD is that the assumptions underlying the design are testable. The
main assumption is that the densities of observations and observed covariates are essen-
tially randomly assigned across the cutoff. I test for bunching across the cutoff and differ-
ences in observed covariates and show that these assumptions are not violated. Given these
confirmations in the data, causal inference is possible. The estimates therefore represent the
same treatment on the treated parameter that would be identified in a random experiment.
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My main results show that larger loans cause moderate-income customers to borrow
more over the next year. For each additional $100 borrowed near the $2,500 cap, customers
take out 3 more loans from the company over the next year. In total, they borrow an
additional $1,400 from the company over the next year. Additionally, I show that selection
into future borrowing with the company cannot be the cause of these differences. Borrowers
who receive a $100 larger loan are no more likely to default, become delinquent on, or
renew the original loan. Customers do not differ across the cutoff in their ability to repay
their initial loan, so there are no changes in future supply.
Together, my results suggest that debt spirals may not be a large concern. Although
a customer who receives a larger loan will borrow more from the company over the next
year, this fact alone does not mean that he is in a debt spiral. The customers are not more
likely to have obvious difficulty repaying the initial loan, nor do they renew the loan more
often. This suggests that the borrowing is not continuous. Instead, customers may borrow
from the company over the next year because they have found a reliable source of credit. If
this is the case, then the critics’ fears that these loans are disastrous for customers may be
unfounded.
The most appropriate form of regulation for these loans, then, may not target loan size.
Instead, it may be better for legislatures to regulate other specific features. For example,
some states allow lenders to sue customers who have defaulted for any remaining balances
even once the car has been repossessed. Preventing companies from doing this would limit
the size of the losses that customers experience. Legislatures could also limit the number
of times that people can renew a loan, which would more directly address the idea of a debt
spiral.
There are some limits to the study. First, I only use data from one company, so the
results represent an estimate of future borrowing from this company only. Customers may
choose to switch to a different firm, and I cannot capture the effect of current borrowing
from this company on future borrowing from other companies. This is less of an issue than
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it may initially appear. All customers choose to take a loan from this company, so there is
no question of obtaining a larger loan somewhere else. There is some customer stickiness
in the title loan market since the customer cannot obtain a new loan from another company
while she has a loan from one company, so having received a loan from this company
suggests the customer would return here. In addition, because the kink is created by a legal
cap on the size of loans, borrowers have a limited ability to switch to another company to
obtain a larger loan.2 Together, these results suggest that switching to another company,
while not accounted for in this paper, is not a major concern. Second, RKD is, by design,
only a local estimate. The effect of loan size is only correctly identified near the cap of
$2,500.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I.2 provides background information
on title loans and the previous consumer credit literature. Section I.3 presents the data and
methodology used in this paper. Section I.4 presents first stage estimates of the kink in the
relationship between car value and loan size. Section I.5 reports the estimates of the effect
of loan size on several outcomes. Section I.6 discusses several robustness checks. Finally
Section I.7 discusses the results and future research.
I.2 Background information
This section provides background information necessary to understand my empirical strat-
egy. First, I explain the underwriting rules that generate an appropriate setting in which
to examine the effect of larger loans on future borrowing. Next, I describe the previous
literature on small-dollar credit and the gap that my paper fills.
I.2.1 Title loans
The combination of firm lending rules and the legal cap on the size of the loans in the title
lending market allows me to identify an exogenous change in credit for borrowers near the
2Other companies may offer larger loans for a given car value, which means that the loan offer from this
company is binding only for people who do not switch to another company. The company advertises that it
offers larger loans than its competitors, but this does eliminate the possibility that they do not.
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loan size cap. Title loan customers are generally credit constrained, so we would expect an
increase in loan size to have a meaningful impact on their behaviors.
Title loans are short-term, high-interest loans, in which a borrower uses his car title
as collateral for the loan. The typical title loan is for $500 to $3,000 and has a 30-day
term.3 The loans are expensive, usually costing $25 a month for every $100 borrowed for
an annualized percentage rate (APR) of 300 percent. This rate is similar to a payday loan,
another important source of short-term credit. In a typical transaction, the customer brings
her vehicle to a title lending store, and the employee verifies the customer’s identity and that
she owns the title to the vehicle. The employee also examines the vehicle and determines
its value. The company then offers the customer a percentage of the value of the vehicle
in cash, to be repaid along with the fee at the end of 30 days. The company either keeps
possession of the title or places a lien on the vehicle until the customer completely repays
the loan. At most companies, the value of the vehicle is the only information considered
in determining whether and how much to lend.4 When the loan matures, the borrower can
repay the principal and fees to retire the debt; she can pay only the fees and renew, or
roll over, the loan for another 30 days; or she can default on her loan, in which case the
company has the right to repossess her vehicle.
Regulation of the title lending industry varies significantly across states, although there
are several common regulations. Thirty states ban title loans altogether, either through
specific legislation or strict interest rate limits. In the 20 states that allow title loans, specific
regulations are intended to limit the potential negative impacts of loans by controlling one
of the supposedly negative features of the loans. Fourteen states place interest caps on the
loans to limit the cost of the loans. These limits are generally in the triple digits; only two
states limit interest rates to below 36 percent APR. Eleven states cap the number of times
a customer can roll over her loan or require that payments to roll over the loan include
3As discussed below, loans are capped at $2,500 in Tennessee. Other states allow larger loans.
4The data used in this study comes from a company that also considers income in making its loan deci-
sions. This is somewhat uncommon in the industry. This means that the results may not be generalizable to
all income groups.
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payment of part of the principal. These regulations seek to limit the length of time that
a borrower is in debt to the company. Seven states, including Tennessee, cap the size
of the loan to prevent borrowers from taking unaffordable loans (Consumer Federation of
America, 2012). In 1995, the Tennessee state legislature passed the Title Pledge Act, which
established specific rules governing title loans. Among other provision, the Act capped title
loans at $2,500.5 The statute also effectively caps the interest rate at 264 percent.6
I.2.2 Small-dollar credit literature
Because of the early use of bans as the main form of regulation, previous research has
focused on the effect of receiving a small-dollar loan or access to the loan rather than the
effect of features like loan size. These papers have found conflicting estimates of the effects
of taking a loan on consumer outcomes. Only one of these papers has specifically looked
at how the size of the subprime loan affects consumer outcomes.
Additionally, most of the papers only look at access to payday loans. Two of these pa-
pers find negative effects of access to these loans. Carrell and Zinman (2008) use random
assignment of airmen to military bases and finds that access decreases military personnel
performance across several criteria. Using survey responses from the National Survey of
America’s Families, Melzer (2011) finds that access to payday lending increased the like-
lihood of experiencing financial hardship, particularly for people in the target payday loan
population. On the other hand, several papers find positive effects of access to title loans.
Morse (2009) finds that access to payday lending leads to fewer foreclosures and larcenies
following a natural disaster. Edmiston (2011) uses credit report data and finds that counties
where payday lending is legal have a smaller share of individuals with credit scores in the
bottom 5 percent of the overall distribution than counties where payday lending is illegal.
People in counties that allowed payday loans were also less likely to have late bill pay-
5Tenn. Code Ann. §45-15-115(3), discussed in Section I.3.2
6Tenn. Code Ann. §45-15-115(111). The statute allows companies to charge 2 percent interest on each
monthly loan and up to 20 percent of the principal in fees that are not considered interest. For the purposes
of calculating APR, however, these fees are included, according to the Truth in Lending Act.
9
ments. Zinman (2010) compares the experiences of borrowers in Oregon, which capped
payday lending interest rates, with borrowers in Washington, which did not cap rates. He
finds that, after the rate cap, borrowing in Oregon did fall relative to borrowing in Wash-
ington, but people in Oregon were more likely to experience a negative financial outcome
than people in Washington.
Two papers use administrative data from a payday lender to examine the impact of ac-
tually obtaining a payday loan. Bhutta et al. (2012) link administrative data from a payday
lender to a credit agency. They find that obtaining a loan has no effect on a consumer’s
credit score or other measures of financial well-being in the long run. On the other hand,
Skiba and Tobacman (2009) use a regression discontinuity design and find that borrowers
who are just approved for a payday loan are more likely to file for bankruptcy in the next
two years than borrowers who are just rejected. In addition, they identify a potential causal
mechanism for this increased bankruptcy filing rate. They find that a person who is just
approved for a payday loan will borrow an additional $1,800 over the next year.
In terms of predicting the effect of regulation, the existing research from payday loans
only provides evidence on the effect of obtaining a loan. In addition, this evidence is
somewhat contradictory. The previous research says nothing about the decision to place
caps on the size of these loans if states choose to allow them. Additionally, there is no
research that specifically addresses the effect of title loans. This paper fills these gaps in
the literature on short-term, high-interest credit.
This paper also relates to another literature on consumer demand for credit more gen-
erally and the liquidity constraints that borrowers face. These papers estimate the marginal
propensity to consume (MPC) out of either an additional dollar of credit or a one-time in-
come increase. Two papers examine the MPC out of an additional dollar of credit. In the
payday loan market, Dobbie and Skiba (2013) estimate that borrowers are fairly liquidity
constrained and borrow almost half of each additional dollar of credit. Gross and Souleles
(2002) study the credit card market and find that customers who have over 90 percent of
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their credit line in outstanding credit also borrow close to half of each additional dollar.
Several additional papers look at the effect of the 2001 and 2008 tax rebates on con-
sumer spending. Johnson et al. (2006) use the Consumer Expenditure Survey and find that
low asset households spent almost half of their 2001 tax rebate in the 3-month period dur-
ing which they receive their check. Parker et al. (2011) also use the Consumer Expenditure
Survey and find that, following the 2008 tax rebate, households spent between 50 percent
and 90 percent of their rebates when durable goods are included. Agarwal et al. (2007)
look at administrative data from a credit card issuer and find that on average, spending
on that card alone increased 40 percent in the 9 months following the rebate. Customers
who had card utilization ratios above 90 percent increased their spending by almost 67 per-
cent. Skiba (forthcoming) also looks at the effect of the tax rebate. Instead of estimating
consumption, she looks at the probability of taking out a payday loan. She finds that the
probability falls after receiving the rebate, suggesting that the demand for short-term credit
comes from a lack of liquidity. Similarly, Bertrand and Morse (2009) look at the 2008 tax
rebate and find that low-intensity payday loan users retired debt after receiving their rebate.
Their results also suggest that, at least for some borrowers, liquidity constraints rather than
lack of money drive high-interest borrowing. Altogether, these papers suggest that liquidity
constraints are present for many consumers and that there are important differences across
consumers. I estimate a similar measure and compare it to the measures from the other
papers.
I.3 Data and methodology
In this section, I describe the administrative dataset and the fuzzy regression kink design
that together allow me to make causal inferences in spite of the endogeneity problem..
I.3.1 Data
The data for this study come from a large provider of alternative financial services in Ten-
nessee. The company offers title loans, payday loans, and installment loans, as well as
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check cashing services.7 The data consist of all loans made between January 2012 and
June 2014. For each loan, I have information on the loan eligibility, the actual amount
borrowed, and the outcome of the loan (paid on time, paid late, defaulted, voided), as well
as several demographic variables about the borrower himself. I can follow both loans and
customers over the entire period, so I can examine not only the outcome of one loan, but
also the full borrowing history of the customer. I also observe some information on those
who were denied a loan or who turned down the company’s offer for a shorter period of
time.
Table I.1 provides summary statistics for the moderate-income customers I consider.
The average borrower is slightly older than the typical non-traditional lending consumer,
but this makes sense since the borrower must own his vehicle outright. Sixty-six percent
of borrowers are male, which is also atypical in non-traditional lending.8 The cars are gen-
erally older, with an average age of 12 years and average mileage of 162,000 miles.9 The
average Black Book value, which is described in detail in the next subsection, is $2,860.
The average loan size is $1,028.
Table I.1 also describes the outcomes of the initial loan. Only 1 percent of borrowers
default on their loan, and 13 percent are delinquent at least one day on their payments. The
average number of rollovers is 0.21, meaning that most customers repay the initial loan in
full at the end of the month.
I.3.2 Methodology
The institutional features of the title lending market in Tennessee mean that fuzzy RKD can
be used to isolate the effect of a larger loan from the demand side effects that cause a person
to take a larger loan. The statutory cap on the size of title loans sets up a situation in which
7Installment loans are high interest, uncollateralized loans, usually with a term of 12 months.
8See Bos et al. (2012), Skiba and Tobacman (2009), and Fritzdixon et al. (2014) for the demographics of
other alternative financial services users.
9Fifty-two vehicles have mileage over 1,000,000. Since this seems unrealistic, I drop all mileages over
this point in all calculations.
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there is a kink in the relationship between the customer’s car value and the amount she can
borrow. Customers can borrow 100 percent of the value of their vehicle, up to the legal
cap of $2,500. After that point, any increase in car value does not lead to an increase in
loan size. Together, these rules induce a kink in the relationship between car value and loan
size. By looking for a kink in the relationship between car value and future borrowing at
the same $2,500 cutoff, I can determine the effect of loan size on the amount the customer
borrows over the next year.
Regression kink design grew out of the regression discontinuity design (RDD) litera-
ture, first proposed by Thistlewaithe and Campbell (1960). RDD and RKD are used when
the variable of interest is a function of another observable covariate so that it is difficult to
separate the two effects.10 In RDD, there is a discontinuous jump in the variable of interest
that occurs at some value of another covariate, known as the running variable. In RKD,
rather than a jump in the variable of interest, there is a kink in the slope of the assign-
ment function, which assigns a value of the variable of interest to each value of the running
variable.
To make this setup concrete, consider the model:
Y = y(B,V,U) = τB+g(V )+U (I.1)
where B is the regressor of interest, V is another observable covariate, and U is an unob-
served covariate. In sharp RKD, B is a deterministic function of V, so that it is impossible
to isolate the impact of B on the outcome from the impact of V. If there is a kink in the
relationship between V and B at v0, however, it is possible to separate the effect of B from
the effect of V for a neighborhood of v0. The deterministic assignment function as can be
written as:
10Throughout this section I use the framework developed in Card et al. (2012) because it is the standard
for RKD.
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B= b(V ) =

ρ1v v< v0
ρ2v v≥ v0
(I.2)
where ρ1 6= ρ2.
Then to determine the effect of B on Y, we estimate the change in slope of the outcome
function y(B,V,U) using local polynomial regression. The estimate of this change in slope
is the difference between the right hand limit and left hand limit of the derivative of the
conditional expectation function. Dividing that estimate by the deterministic change in the
slope of the assignment function, ρ2−ρ1, provides the estimate of the effect of a one unit
increase in B. This yields the estimator:
τˆ =
limv→v+0
dE(Y |V=v)
dv − limv→v−0
dE(Y |V=v)
dv
ρ2−ρ1 (I.3)
where limv→v+0 means the limit as v approaches v0 from above. This estimator is equivalent
to the treatment on the treated effect from Florens et al. (2008).
In the fuzzy RKD, which I use in this paper, the assignment function is no longer
deterministic; there is some slippage between the assignment rule and the actual value of
B. In this case, we also estimate the denominator so the estimator of the effect is:
τˆ =
limv→v+0
dE(Y |V=v)
dv − limv→v−0
dE(Y |V=v)
dv
limv→v+0
dE(B|V=v)
dv − limv→v−0
dE(B|V=v)
dv
(I.4)
The company’s lending rules and the legal loan size cap interact to create a fuzzy kink
in the Tennessee title lending market. To separate the demand side determinants of loan
size, I make use of the fact that the company’s offer curve depends on the Black Book
value of the borrower’s vehicle and the statutory limit in loan size. The running variable
is therefore the Black Book value. The Black Book value is a moving 3-week average of
wholesale prices that is updated weekly, so the customer would not necessarily know her
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Black Book value before seeking a loan, nor would she be able to perfectly manipulate it.
The loan offer size is a proportion of the value of the vehicle, where the proportion
depends on the borrower’s annual income.11 The kink occurs because Tennessee sets a
cap on the size of title loans. Under Tennessee law, lenders cannot offer a title loan over
$2,500.12 This statutory rule interacts with the company’s underwriting rules to create a
kink in the amount customers can borrow. The loan offer is a deterministic function of the
car value, but the actual loan size also depends on the borrower’s choice. Because of this,
I use a fuzzy RKD, which allows me to control for the demand side characteristics in the
estimations of the outcomes. The kink in loan offer is shown in Table I.2 and Figure I.1.
Moderate-income customers can borrow 100 percent of the value of their cars, up to the
legal cap of $2,500. This creates the cutoff at $2,500.13
Recent papers have shown that if there is curvature in the underlying relationship be-
tween the assignment variable and the outcomes, then the Card et al. (2012) standard errors
must be corrected. This is a function of optimal bandwidth selection mechanisms when us-
ing nonparametric local polynomial regression, as in RDD or RKD. Calonico et al. (2014)
(referred to as CCT henceforth) show that optimal RDD bandwidths result in leading bias,
but that typical bias correction leads to standard errors that are too small.14 This means
that, with underlying curvature, the standard estimators in the literature will over-reject the
null hypothesis. CCT develop a bias corrected estimator and confidence interval that takes
account of the leading bias and scales the standard errors to deal with the poor finite sample
properties of the bias correction. Ganong and Ja¨ger (2014) verify that the CCT procedure
works well for the fuzzy regression kink design when there is underlying curvature if local
11The proportion also depends on the value of the vehicle, so that there are discontinuous jumps in the
offer curve at lower values than used in this study. The company’s customer service agents, however, have
the right to make some small changes in the loan offer, so I focus in this paper on the statutory limit that the
company cannot violate.
12Tenn. Code Ann. §45-15-115(3)
13It is possible that the company and customer could circumvent the state cap by offering additional loan
products to those above the cap but not to those below it. There is no evidence, however, that customers on
either side of the cap take an additional loan concurrently with the title loan at different rates.
14See Fan and Gijbels (1996) for bias correction and standard error corrections.
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quadratic or local cubic regressions are used. They find that the CCT estimators correctly
reject the null hypothesis approximately 95 percent of the time when the data do have an
underlying quadratic relationship. I use the CCT coefficients and standard errors through-
out my analysis. I present linear, quadratic, and cubic polynomials for my first stage results
to check the consistency of my estimates, but I focus on the quadratic regressions. For my
second stage results, I only show quadratic estimates.
I.4 First stage
The first-stage regressions provide evidence that the kink in the relationship between the
value of the car and loan offer leads to a kink in the relationship between the value of the
car and the loan size. Figure I.2 show the average loan sizes in $50 Black Book value bins
for moderate-income customers. The figure also includes fitted values from a local linear
specification, so the smoothed line controls for the Black Book value interacted with being
above the $2,500 cutoff. The figure shows a clear kink in the relationship at the $2,500
cutoff point.
To formally examine the relationships shown in these figures, I also estimate a standard
first stage regression that includes separate slopes for borrowers above and below the cutoff.
In particular, I estimate equation I.5:
Loanit = β0 +β11(BlackBookit > cuto f f )∗ (BlackBookit− cuto f f )
+ f (BlackBookit− cuto f f )+δXit + εit (I.5)
Here Loanit represents the size of the title loan, 1(BlackBookit > cuto f f ) is an indicator
variable for having a car value above the $2,500 cutoff, f (BlackBookit−cuto f f ) is a poly-
nomial of the value of the vehicle relative to the cutoff; and Xit is a vector of customer and
loan demographics, which are available from the information collected by the company.
These include age, sex, annual income, months at current residence, and months at current
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job for the borrower; vehicle age and mileage; and the APR of the loan.
I show the results from several polynomial specifications in Table I.3. Column 1 shows
the local linear specification with no controls. Column 2 introduces demographic controls
in the local linear specification. Column 3 presents the local quadratic specification. Col-
umn 4 includes the local cubic specification. Loanoffer represents the interaction between
being above the cutoff and the car value. The regression results confirm what is shown in
the figure. There is a clear change in slope at the cutoff point. The coefficients on loan offer
are significant and of the same sign and magnitude for each specification. The same is true
for the coefficients on the Black Book value. Although the coefficients do not vary signifi-
cantly across specifications, I focus on the quadratic specification because of the possibility
of curvature in the underlying relationship between Black Book value and loan size.
I can convert the coefficient on Black Book value from these regressions into a measure
of the liquidity constraints that customers face. The coefficient represents the additional
amount borrowed per dollar increase in the value of the car under $2,500. Since there is a
one-to-one relationship between car value and loan offer for cars worth less than $2,500,
this coefficient is also the additional amount borrowed per dollar increase in credit. This
measure is referred to as the marginal propensity to consume out of liquidity. My esti-
mates from the title lending market are larger than those found in other credit markets,
both traditional and non-traditional. Customers borrow $0.54 for every additional dollar of
credit. This value implies that title loan borrowers are quite liquidity constrained. Gross
and Souleles (2002) estimate this measure for a sample of credit card borrowers. They find
that borrowers consume between $0.10 and $0.14 of each additional dollar of credit overall,
but that customers who have already borrowed over 90 percent of their credit line borrow
$0.45 of their additional credit. Johnson et al. (2006) examine the impact of the Income Tax
Rebate of 2001 on consumer spending and find that consumers spent $0.20 to $0.40 of each
dollar received. Liquidity constrained borrowers spent $0.48 of each additional dollar on
strictly nondurable goods. Agarwal et al. (2007) look at administrative data from a credit
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card issuer and find that on average, spending on that card alone increased 40 percent in
the 9 months following the tax rebate. Customers who had card utilization ratios above 90
percent increased their spending by almost 67 percent. Dobbie and Skiba (2013) estimate
the same measure for the payday loan market, the closest market to the title lending mar-
ket, and they find that customers borrow $0.39 to $0.44 for each additional dollar of credit.
This suggests that liquidity constraints are more important in the title lending market than
in other consumer credit markets.
The coefficient on Loanoffer yields the estimated size of the kink in loan size at the
appropriate cutoff. This kink will serve as a “measure of treatment” for the groups and is
used as a scaling factor in calculating the effect of a larger loan on future borrower behavior.
The estimated kink is -0.556, which is about half the size of the kink in the offer curve of
-1.15 The estimated kink of -0.556 means that the slope of the relationship between falls
by .556 when the car value crosses the $2,500 cutoff.
I.5 Outcomes
Since there is evidence of a kink in the relationship between Black Book value and loan
size, I look at 2 measures of future borrowing: the number of loans taken and the total
amount borrowed. I add up the number of loans the customer has with the company in all
loan products over the next year in 1 month intervals. Figure I.3a presents a representative
month.16 The figure shows the average number of loans taken over 6 months in $50 car
value bins. Although it is not obvious from the averages, there does appear to be a decrease
in the slope at the $2,500 cutoff. Table I.4 show the estimates of equation I.4 for the number
of future loans and total amount borrowed over the next 12 months in 1 month intervals.
The first column presents estimates for the effect on number of loans taken over each of the
next 12 months. The second column presents estimates for total dollar amount borrowed
over the next 12 months. Each cell represents an individual estimate. Figure I.4a plots
15The change in slope of the offer curve is the negative of the value of the slope before reaching the cutoff,
since after the cutoff, the slope is zero.
16Figures for other months are available upon request.
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these coefficients and the 95 percent confidence intervals for the estimate of the effect of
current loan size on number of future loans. There is a significant effect of current loan size
on future borrowing. For each additional $100 borrowed today, the number of future loans
increases by 2 loans in the next 4 months, up to 3 loans in the next 6 months.17
This pattern of increased borrowing is confirmed by estimates of the effect of loan size
on the total amount borrowed in the next year. I combine the amount borrowed on all three
loan products offered to look at the total borrowed over the year in 1 month intervals. Figure
I.3b shows 1 representative month. As I did for number of loans, I present average total
amount borrowed for $50 Black Book value bins over the next 6 months. There appears
to be a clear kink in the slope of the conditional expectation function at the $2,500 cutoff.
Table 4 shows the results of regressions of total amount borrowed on loan size for the next
12 months. Figure I.4b plots the coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals for these
regressions. Customers who receive a larger loan, consistent with taking out more loans,
borrow more over the course of the next year. For each $100 increase in current borrowing,
they borrow $1,400 more over the next 6 months. This estimate is in line with results in
Skiba and Tobacman (2009), who find that receiving a $300 loan increases borrowing by
$1,800 over the next 2 years compared to people who do not receive a loan.
One concern in interpreting these results may be that there is a change in the amount
borrowed over the next year because loan size affects repayment rates for the initial loan.
If larger loans cause people to default at a different rate, then, since the company does not
allow a customer to borrow again until the default is repaid, the ability to borrow from the
company would change across the kink. I find, however, that the probability of default,
delinquency, and rollovers does not vary across the cutoff. Figure I.5 plots the average
probability of default or delinquency and the average number of rollovers for $50 car value
17The coefficient falls for greater lengths of time, which appears counter-intuitive given that I am exam-
ining cumulative future loans. This may be happening because of potential cohort effects, which I do not
explore in this paper.
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bins. Delinquency is measured in two ways. The first measure is any late payment.18
The second measure is being at least 15 days delinquent on a loan. There may be a slight
negative effect of being above the cutoff, but none of the groups shows a clear kink in the
probability of default at the cutoff. The final panel shows the average number of rollovers
in $50 car value bins. There is no apparent effect of being above the cutoff on number of
rollovers.
The estimates for the loan repayment measures support the impression from the figures
that repayment behavior does not differ across the cutoff. Table I.5 shows the estimates of
the effect of loan size on the probability of default and the two measures of delinquency
and the number of rollovers. The regressions confirm the results from the figures. There
is no statistically significant effect of loan size on the probability of default or delinquency
or on the number of rollovers. A larger loan size does not seem to have an effect on the
borrowers’ ability to repay the initial loan. This implies that selection into future borrowing
from repaying the first loan is not a concern. It also suggests that customers who receive a
larger loan do not have more difficulty repaying their loans.
I.6 Robustness checks
I present several robustness checks to verify my main results. First, I report tests of the
assumptions underlying the regression kink design, which show that there is no bunching
of customers on either side of the $2,500 cutoff. Second I show that the estimates are not
sensitive to the bandwidth chosen, except at very small bandwidths. Finally I present a
falsification test for the location of the kink.
One of the benefits of RKD is that the underlying assumptions can be tested. An impor-
tant issue in RKD is whether borrowers can manipulate the running variable so that they are
not randomly assigned to either side of the kink point. To examine this possibility, I plot the
density of loans on either side of the $2,500 cutoff. Figure I.6 shows the number of obser-
18Because the title loans only have a term of 30 days, the traditional delinquency measure of 60 days
without payment does not make sense in the title lending market. I therefore use this alternative measure.
20
vations in $50 Black Book value bins. The lines on the figure represent the local quadratic
fitted values, with a separate quadratic for either side of the cutoff. There is no clear change
in the density of observations across the kink points. The second panel of Table I.6 shows
the corresponding test for a change in density at the cutoff. I regress the number of obser-
vations in $10 Black Book value bins on a quadratic in Black Book value and interaction
of Black Book value and being above the cutoff for that Group. There is no statistically
significant effect of crossing the cutoff on the slope of the density of observations.
A second way to examine the assumptions underlying RKD is to look at the distribution
of observable covariates around the cutoff. If assignment of Black Book value is essentially
random around the cutoff, then there should be no change in the distribution of customer
and loan characteristics across the cutoff. Figure I.7 shows the average value for each
covariate in $50 Black Book value bins for moderate-income borrowers. The figure also
include fitted values from a local linear regression. Only 2 of the 8 covariates appear to
vary across the cutoff.
To test these apparent slope changes in the distribution of the covariates across the cut-
off, I regress each covariate on a quadratic in Black Book value and interaction of Black
Book value and being above the cutoff for that Group. If the observed covariates are ran-
domly assigned across the kink, there should be no significance on the interaction term.
The first panel of Table I.6 presents coefficients on the interaction term. The regression
results confirm the apparent differences from the figures; annual income and sex do differ
in a statistically significant manner across the cutoff. The size of these difference, how-
ever, is economically insignificant. There is a statistically significant decrease in annual
income for borrowers who are above the kink, but the size of the decrease is only $63.
The loan term is only 30 days, so in effect, this is a difference of only a few dollars per
month between borrowers above and below the cutoff. Similarly, the probability of being
male decreases 0.07 percentage points for every $100 above the cutoff. These effects are
in practice unimportant.
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Another potential threat to identification is that borrowers may opt out of borrowing
if they are on one side of the cutoff but not the other. If this is an issue, it should affect
the density plots in Figure I.6, and there does not appear to be any change in the density.
In addition, I can use the limited information on borrowers who chose not to take a title
loan from the company. These data are available for a shorter time period and offer no
demographic information about the customer so I cannot test whether the borrower char-
acteristics are related to the decision to reject a loan offer. However, I can examine the
number of borrowers who chose not to borrow from the company. In the 7 month period
for which the data are available on those who do not borrow, only 340 people chose not to
take the title loan offer. In the same period 18,632 title loans were made. This is a rejection
(by the customer) rate of only 1.8 percent for all income categories.
RKD uses an optimal bandwidth selection method, so I show that the estimates are
not sensitive to the chosen bandwidth. Changing the bandwidth of observations that are
included in the regressions should not measurably affect the coefficient if the effect is ac-
curately estimated. To explore the sensitivity of my results to specific bandwidth choices,
I graph the estimate of the effect of loans size on each outcome for multiple bandwidths
within $250 of the optimally chosen bandwidth. These figures are presented in the online
appendix. The figures show that the coefficients do not vary based on the bandwidth size
for most of the range. This is true for the various outcomes studied. At very small band-
widths, the coefficient size changes, but these bandwidths only contain a small fraction of
the overall sample.
The last potential issue is that the tests are not picking up the effect of the kink, but
instead are identifying the effect of some underlying relationship. Using local quadratic
rather than linear regressions and the CCT corrections should correct for this possiblity, but
it is also possible to test for the location of the kink. To do this, I rerun the RKD regressions
for a large number of pseudo-kinks within $1,000 of the true kink and determine the R-
squared for each of these regressions. If the relationship between the car value and loan
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size and outcomes is truly described by the kink, then we should see a maximum R-squared
around the location of the true kink. The fake kinks encompass $1,000 on either side of the
true kink. These figures are also shown in the data appendix.
Together these robustness checks show that the coefficients are well estimated and do
pick up a true kink.
I.7 Discussion
In this paper, I show that receiving a larger title loan causes moderate-income customers to
borrow more over the next year. I do this by exploiting the combination of the company’s
lending rules, where a loan offer is made as a proportion of the car value, and a legal cap
on the size of the loans. Together, these features induce a kink in the relationship between
car value and loan size. I am able to use fuzzy regression kink design to isolate the effect
of receiving a larger loan from the demand side choice of loan size. I find that customers
who receive a $100 larger loan borrow an additional 3 loans and $1,400 from the company
over the next year.
There are two possible reasons for the increase in future borrowing. One is that con-
sumer advocates are right, and title loans cause customers to become trapped in a cycle
of borrowing. If this were the case, then we should expect to see larger loans also caus-
ing higher rates of default or delinquency or more rollovers. In fact, there is no change
in ability to repay the initial loan at the cutoff. Another possibility is that these borrowers
have simply found a reliable source of credit. This would cause them to borrow more over
the next year from this company not because of an inability to repay their first loan but
because they find loans from this company better than the available alternatives. In future
work, I plan to study the pattern of borrowing in more detail to better determine the effect
of consumer’s behavior.
Additionally, this work focuses only on the short and medium-term effects of the loan
on credit usage. Future work that matched customers to credit report data or employment
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histories would allow me to estimate the impact of title loans on broader measures of finan-
cial well-being. This work would provide a better estimate of the welfare effects of these
loans.
One limitation of the study, like all RD and RK designs, is that the results are local, in
that they only address the impact of larger loans around the loan size cap of $2,500. This
paper cannot address the impact of allowing significantly larger loans. The effect of loan
size on ability to repay is presumably not linear over all values, and so studying the effect
at different sizes would be ideal. Loan size caps vary dramatically across states, and so
future work can use other states’ loan caps to perform a similar analysis in order to develop
estimates of the impact of loan size over a range of values.
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Figure I.1: Firm offer curve
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Notes: This figure illustrates the company’s lending rules for moderate-income borrowers.
Figure I.2: First stage kink between Black Book value and loan size
50
0
15
00
25
00
Lo
an
 s
iz
e
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
Black Book value
Notes: This figure plots the average loan size in $50 bins of Black Book car value. The
solid, red lines are the predicted values from local linear regressions of the underlying data,
allowing for a discontinuous slope at the cutoff. The vertical line shows the cutoff Black
Book car value.
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Figure I.3: Future borrowing over 6 months
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Notes: This figure plots the average number of loans taken (panel a) and the total amount
borrowed (panel b) in the 6 months following an initial loan in $50 bins of Black Book
car value. The solid, red lines are the predicted values from local linear regressions of the
underlying data, allowing for a discontinuous slope at the cutoff. The vertical line shows
the cutoff Black Book car value.
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Figure I.4: Estimates of coefficient over 12 months
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Notes: This figure presents the number of loans taken out (panel a) and total amount bor-
rowed (panel b) in the year following the initial loan, by month. The solid line shows the
bias-corrected coefficient for the effect of loan size on number of loans. The dashed lines
are the 95 percent confidence intervals.
27
Fi
gu
re
I.5
:A
bi
lit
y
to
re
pa
y
in
iti
al
lo
an
0.02.04.06
Default
0
10
00
20
00
30
00
40
00
50
00
Bl
ac
k 
Bo
ok
 v
al
ue
D
ef
au
lt
0.2.4.6.8
No. of rollovers
0
10
00
20
00
30
00
40
00
50
00
Bl
ac
k 
Bo
ok
 v
al
ue
N
o.
 o
f r
ol
lo
ve
rs
0.1.2.3.4.5
Delinquent
0
10
00
20
00
30
00
40
00
50
00
Bl
ac
k 
Bo
ok
 v
al
ue
D
el
in
qu
en
t
0.1.2.3.4.5
Delinquent 15 days
0
10
00
20
00
30
00
40
00
50
00
Bl
ac
k 
Bo
ok
 v
al
ue
D
el
in
qu
en
t 1
5 
da
ys
N
ot
es
:T
hi
s
fig
ur
e
pl
ot
s
th
e
av
er
ag
e
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
of
de
fa
ul
ta
nd
tw
o
m
ea
su
re
s
of
de
lin
qu
en
cy
,a
nd
av
er
ag
e
nu
m
be
ro
fr
ol
lo
ve
rs
in
$5
0
bi
ns
of
B
la
ck
B
oo
k
ca
rv
al
ue
.T
he
so
lid
,r
ed
lin
es
ar
e
th
e
pr
ed
ic
te
d
va
lu
es
fr
om
lo
ca
ll
in
ea
rr
eg
re
ss
io
ns
of
th
e
un
de
rl
yi
ng
da
ta
,a
llo
w
in
g
fo
ra
di
sc
on
tin
uo
us
sl
op
e
at
th
e
cu
to
ff
.T
he
ve
rt
ic
al
lin
e
sh
ow
s
th
e
cu
to
ff
B
la
ck
B
oo
k
ca
rv
al
ue
.
28
Figure I.6: Density of observations
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Notes: This figure presents graphical evidence of the RKD assumption that the distribution
of the assignment variable is smooth across the cutoff. I plot the number of loans in $10
bins of Black Book car value. The solid, red lines are the predicted values of quadratic
regressions from the underlying data, allowing for a discontinuous slope at the cutoff.
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Table I.1: Summary statistics
Mean Std. Dev. N
Demographics
Age 44.53 11.42 9,703
Sex 0.66 0.47 9,703
Mos. at current address 94.27 546.15 9,703
Mos. at current job 101.02 118.36 9,703
Vehicle age 12.38 4.79 9,703
Vehicle mileage 161,873 71,789 9,664
Black Book value 2,860 2,707 9,597
Loan characteristics
Loan size 1028.73 713.58 9,703
APR 244.20 117.17 8,663
Loan outcomes
Default 0.01 0.09 9,703
Late payment 0.13 0.33 9,703
Rollovers 0.21 0.68 9,703
Source: Author’s calculations. Vehicle mileage
calculations exclude any vehicle with mileage
above 1,000,000 miles (52 vehicles).
Table I.2: Offer curve for moderate income borrowers
Black Book car value Moderate income
$1,500 - $2,500 1*Black Book
$2,500 - $3,125 $2,500
$3,125 - $4,000 $2,500
$4,000 and above $2,500
Source: Company’s information. The
Edmund’s Black Book car value is a
rolling average of wholesale prices.
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Table I.3: First stage regressions of loan size on Black Book value
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Loan offer -0.619*** -0.567*** -0.556*** -0.629***
(0.0349) (0.0402) (0.136) (0.150)
Black Book value 0.599*** 0.545*** 0.539*** 0.544***
(0.0152) (0.0200) (0.0668) (0.0673)
Black Book squared -3.66e-06 2.47e-05
(3.56e-05) (4.23e-05)
Black Book cubed 2.17e-08*
(1.877)
Month-year fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Demographic controls N Y Y Y
Observations 8,275 6,173 6,173 6,173
R-squared 0.209 0.249 0.249 0.249
Notes: This table presents OLS estimates of the first stage effect of the
regression kink equation. Outcome is loan size. Each regression in-
cludes month-year time dummies. Columns (2) through (4) include de-
mographic controls. Robust standard errors are in parentheses below the
coefficients. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table I.4: Future borrowing from the company over the next 12 months
Time period No. of loans Amount borrowed
One month 0.00234*** 1.8076***
(0.001) (0.554)
Two months 0.00611*** 4.8584***
(0.002) (1.289)
Three months 0.0155*** 8.5545***
(0.006) (2.252)
Four months 0.01962*** 10.582***
0.007 (2.592)
Five months 0.03089*** 12.623***
(0.013) (3.024)
Six months 0.03276*** 13.927***
(0.013) (3.262)
Seven months 0.03133*** 13.935***
(0.010) (3.259)
Eight months 0.02906*** 13.712***
(0.009) (3.297)
Nine months 0.02565*** 12.865***
(0.007) (3.210)
Ten months 0.02559*** 12.267***
(0.007) (3.230)
Eleven months 0.02341*** 10.866***
(0.006) (3.178)
Twelve months 0.02284*** 10.57***
(0.006) (3.214)
Notes: This table presents the RKD estimates of the loan size on total amount borrowed
over the next 12 months, by month, using the biased-correction proposed in Calonico,
Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014). Each cell represents a separate estimate. Bias-corrected
standard errors presented in parentheses below the coefficients. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***
p<0.01
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Table I.5: Ability to repay initial loan
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Default Delinquency Delinquent 15 days No. of rollovers
Loan size 0.00001 0.00009 0.00000 -0.00018
(0.00003) (0.00010) (0.00006) (0.00017)
Notes: This table presents RKD estimates of the loan size on default,
delinquency, and rollovers, using the biased-corrected standard errors
proposed in Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014). Bias-corrected stan-
dard errors presented in parentheses below the coefficients. * p<0.1; **
p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Table I.6: Tests of random assignment of borrowers
Covariates
Age -2.714
(-1.330)
Annual percentage rate 0.00745
(0.122)
Annual income -63.34***
(-3.505)
Vehicle mileage -37.87
(-0.669)
Vehicle age -0.000134
(-0.0331)
Months at current job 0.0254
(0.268)
Months at current address -0.0356
(-0.549)
Sex -0.000743**
(-2.568)
Number of observations 0.0532
(0.0746)
Notes: This table presents tests of the assumptions
underlying regression kink. The first panel shows
results of tests of quasi-random assignment of the
observed covariates. The coefficients are for the
interaction between Black Book value and being
above the cutoff for each income group. The de-
pendent variable is the observed covariate. The
second panel reports reduced form estimates of the
change in density of loans for $10 Black Book
value bins. All regressions include a quadratic in
Black Book value. Robust standard errors pre-
sented in parentheses below the coefficient. *
p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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CHAPTER II
Auto title lending and consumer bankruptcy: Evidence from county filing rates
II.1 Introduction
Auto title loans, in which a customer uses his car title as collateral to borrow $500-$3,000
at 300 percent APR, are a growing part of the non-traditional lending market. These loans
have been hotly debated in state legislatures across the country, and the Consumer Finan-
cial Protection Bureau, which has the power to create national regulations, is particularly
interested in products like title loans. Proponents say that title loans fill an important gap in
the credit market for high-risk borrowers who would be denied credit by traditional lenders.
As such, the loans should improve consumer welfare. Critics, on the other hand, seek regu-
lation for title loans because they believe the companies offer predatory products and trick
customers into taking their loans. They argue that the loans drive customers into financial
ruin and bankruptcy. Despite this debate, there is little empirical evidence on the effect of
these loans on customers. This paper provides the first causal analysis of the effects of title
lending access on financial well-being.
The challenge in studying the effect of access to title loans on bankruptcy is that ac-
cess to title loans is not randomly distributed. State legislatures choose whether to allow
title loans in conjunction with other financial regulation decisions, such as the homestead
exemption in bankruptcy filings. If states with generally credit friendly policies have both
legal title loans and higher bankruptcy filings rates, then any estimates of the effect of title
loan availability on bankruptcy filings will be biased upwards.
I use two strategies to overcome this potential bias. First, I use legislative changes in
title lending legality to generate geographic variation in access to title loans. I perform
difference-in-difference regressions using law changes that either allow or prohibit title
lending. Bankruptcy laws are relatively stable so this method controls for the differences
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between debtor-friendly and creditor-friendly states. Underlying differences in bankruptcy
rates between these states will be eliminated from the difference-in-difference estimates.
Second, I exploit the fact that consumers can cross state lines to take out a title loan if
the state in which they live prohibits title lending.1 People who live in a state that prohibits
title loans but near the border of a state that allows title loans have greater access than
people who live farther from the border. I do the same difference-in-difference estimation
as above, but use changes in neighboring state laws rather than own state laws.
My results show that access to title loans decreases the bankruptcy filing rate by 0.96
to 1.2 filings per 10,000 people. From a mean personal bankruptcy filing rate of 32.1
bankruptcy filings per 10,000 residents, this represents a 3.0 to 3.7 percent decrease. This
fall in filings is concentrated in Ch. 7 bankruptcy filings, in which a filer liquidates his
assets but has his debt immediately discharged. Ch. 13 filings, in which a borrower keeps
his assets but must make payments for the next 3-5 years, may increase with title lending
access, but the results are not statistically significant.
The effect of access to title loans on bankruptcy filing rates is an empirical question
because the theoretical welfare implications of title lending are ambiguous. On the one
hand, higher risk groups are often denied access to credit in the traditional banking sector
because small loans are too costly for a bank to make. Title lending could then fill an
important credit gap for riskier borrowers. In fact, title lending is popular in states that ban
payday lending, another source of credit for riskier borrowers. Therefore this type of credit
could allow borrowers to smooth consumption in light of unexpected shocks to income
or consumption. On the other hand, borrowers may mistakenly use title loans or become
stuck in a cycle of debt due to common behavioral biases, like present bias, overoptimism,
or limited attention. Unlike rational consumers, these consumers would expect themselves
to behave in one way, but would act differently. Under such circumstances, title lending
would reduce consumer welfare. Since we do not know whether title lending customers
1This is similar to the approach used in Melzer (2011), Carter (2012), and Bhutta (2014).
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suffer from behavioral biases, it is useful to study the outcomes of the loans.
The key assumption for my second empirical strategy is that individuals have the ability
to cross state lines to obtain a title loan. I provide some evidence that this occurs. Using
data from the National Financial Capability Survey, I show that people who live in a state
that prohibits title lending but that borders a state that allows title loans are more likely
to have taken out a title loan in the past 5 years than people who do not live near a state
that allows title loans. Because of the small sample size, these results are only suggestive.
Additionally, I briefly discuss some anecdotal evidence of the importance of cross-border
loans.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II.2 discusses the related literature.
Section II.3 discusses the conflicting theories of consumer borrowing. Section II.4 provides
background on title lending. Section II.5 presents the data used, and Section II.6 discusses
the methodology and main results. Finally, Section II.7 concludes.
II.2 Related literature
This paper relates to two main strands of the economics literature. First, there is a sig-
nificant literature on payday lending, another important source of short-term, high-interest
credit. Payday loans are significantly smaller than title loans, so title loans are likely to
have a larger impact on borrowers than payday loans. Second, there is a significant liter-
ature that attempts to explain the causes of bankruptcy and variations in bankruptcy rates.
This paper adds access to non-traditional credit as a potential cause for differences in filing
rates.
II.2.1 Alternative financial services
There is a growing literature on alternative financial services in general. Most of the re-
search in this area has focused on payday lenders, which offer a similar high-interest,
short-term loan to people who would otherwise be excluded from credit markets. This
research has produced conflicting estimates of the impact of payday loans. Carrell and
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Zinman (2008) find that access to payday loans decreases military personnel performance
across several measures. They exploit the exogenous assignment of airmen to bases in the
United States and find that the likelihood of having a poor performance measure increased
once airmen were stationed at a base where payday lending was legal. Using several mea-
sures of financial hardship, Melzer (2011) finds that access to payday lending increased the
likelihood of experiencing financial hardship, particularly for people who earned between
$15,000 and $50,000, the target payday loan population. Using a regression discontinuity
design, Skiba and Tobacman (2009) find that borrowers who are just approved for a payday
loan are more likely to file for bankruptcy in the next two years than borrowers who are
just rejected.
On the other hand, several papers find that payday loans are not harmful to customers.
Morse (2009) finds that access to payday lending leads to fewer foreclosures and larcenies
following a natural disaster. He concludes that payday loans provide an important form
of quick credit in emergencies. Edmiston (2011) uses data from the TransUnion credit
reporting agency to examine the effects of payday loan bans on credit standing and access.
He finds that counties where payday lending is illegal have a larger share of individuals with
credit scores in the bottom 5 percent of the overall distribution than counties where payday
lending is legal. People in counties that allowed payday loans were also less likely to have
late bill payments. Zinman (2010) compares the experiences of borrowers in Oregon, which
capped payday lending interest rates, with the borrowers in Washington, which did not cap
rates. He finds that, after the rate cap, borrowing in Oregon did fall relative to borrowing in
Washington, but the probability of experiencing an adverse financial outcome increased in
Oregon relative to Washington. Bhutta et al. (2012) link administrative data from a payday
lender to a credit agency and find that payday lending has no effect on a consumer’s credit
score or other measures of financial well-being in the long run, suggesting there may be no
effect or mixed effects of payday lending. Bhutta (forthcoming) uses a similar approach to
the one in this paper to show that access to payday loans has no effect on a person’s credit
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score, a measure of traditional financial well-being.
Together, these papers provide some evidence on the effect of payday loans on con-
sumers. The results, however, are mixed. Additionally, since title loans are larger than
payday loans, their effect on consumers remains an unanswered empirical question.
II.2.2 Causes of bankruptcy
Many researchers have attempted to determine the causes of bankruptcy filing rates and
changes in these rates over time. Between 1980 and 2004, U.S. personal bankruptcy rates
rose more than 500 percent.2 Several theories have been presented to explain this increase:
divorce (Fay et al., 2003); job loss or health care costs (Sullivan et al., 2000; Himmelstein
et al., 2005); and gambling (Barron et al., 2002). These factors appear to be important
for the individual decision to file for bankruptcy, but they cannot explain the overall trend.
White (2007) argues that this general increase was caused by the growth of revolving debt,
especially credit card debt. Dick and Lehnert (2010) also argue that growth in lending
caused by banking deregulation and technological change led to the increase in bankruptcy
rates. These changes occurred at the national or state level, however, and should not play a
large role in explaining county-level variations within a state.
Other researchers have looked at what causes differences in filing rates across geo-
graphic areas. Mann (2009) looks at cross-country differences in bankruptcy filing rates,
and finds that, after controlling for general economic differences, the front end cost and
complexity of filing for bankruptcy have a large effect on bankruptcy filing rates. These
factors are characteristic of the overall bankruptcy system within a country and therefore
do not vary within the United States. Others have focused on state variation in bankruptcy
rates. Miller (2011) finds that state bankruptcy regulations, like the size of exemptions,
affect state bankruptcy filing rates. My analysis focuses on variations between counties
within the same state, and I control for state fixed effects, so these factors should not af-
fect my estimates. Edmiston (2006) looks at regional differences in bankruptcy filing rates
2For a summary of research on the growth in bankruptcy filings, see White (2009).
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and identifies several variables that should influence county bankruptcy filing rates. These
include the divorce rate, the share of people with health insurance, the share of people
who are disabled, and the share of people who are self-employed. Using cross-sectional
county-level data for the year 2000, Edmiston finds that all of these factors can significantly
predict bankruptcy rates. Barron et al (2002) estimate the impact of casino gambling on
bankruptcy filing rates and find large local effects.
These factors clearly matter for the county-level bankruptcy rate, but they cannot com-
pletely explain the differences between counties. Existing literature does not address the
effect of high-interest finance, and in particular title loans, on bankruptcy.3 This paper will
begin to fill this gap in the literature.
During the time period under study, the federal government undertook a major bankruptcy
reform that drastically changed the bankruptcy filing rates. In 2005, it enacted the Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) that significantly changed per-
sonal bankruptcy laws in the United States.4 The two most important changes are the
introduction of means testing for filing Ch. 7 bankruptcy and the increased up front costs
of filing. Both of these changes lowered the bankruptcy filing rate, and in particular the
Ch. 7 filing rate. Because my regressions include year fixed effects, the differences in
bankruptcy filing rates that were caused by the reform should be controlled for.5
II.3 Theories of consumer borrowing
This section discusses the implications of neoclassical and behavioral theories of consumer
behavior for title lending. The theoretical welfare implications of title lending are different
in the neoclassical and behavioral models of consumer behavior.
3One exception is Skiba and Tobacman (2009), who look at the impact of payday lending on bankruptcy
rates.
4For a discussion of the specific changes enacted under BAPCPA, see Wedoff (2007). For a discussion of
its effect on bankruptcy filing rates, see White (2009).
5Because of the dramatic changes in bankruptcy law in 2005, I also run my results separately for the
pre-2005 and post-2005 periods, and I find stronger results on Ch. 7 bankruptcies for the post-2005 period,
suggesting an interaction between the effect of credit and the costs of bankruptcy.
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On the one hand, higher risk groups are often denied access to credit in the traditional
banking sector because the costs of providing the loan are too high and the allowable inter-
est rates are too low for banks to make a profit. Title lending could then fill an important
credit gap for these riskier borrowers. The credit could allow borrowers to smooth con-
sumption in light of unexpected shocks to income or consumption. Under the standard
model, consumers would rationally choose whether to take out a title loan and would there-
fore be made better off (or no worse off) by the existence of title lending.
On the other hand, borrowers may incorrectly choose these loans because of behavioral
biases, like self control or overoptimism problems.6 If borrowers take out the loan expect-
ing (incorrectly) to be able to save to repay the loan, but then fail to save enough because
of self-control problems, then they would be better off ex ante and ex post not taking out
the loan. Similarly, they may be overoptimistic about their ability to repay the loans, and
so they will hold the loan longer than they planned to.
Studies of other non-traditional loans have shown these behavioral anomalies in cus-
tomers. Bertrand and Morse (2011) look at information disclosures in the payday lending
market and find that explicitly adding up the amount of fees paid with each renewal caused
borrowers to decrease the number of times that they renewed the loan. Mann (2013) links
survey data to administrative data from a payday lending firm and finds that 40 percent
of borrowers do not correctly predict how long they will hold their payday loan. In an
analysis of the credit card market, a part of the traditional lending sector, Ausubel (1991)
argues that incorrect consumer expectations about their usage drive the credit card firms’
supernormal profits. Customers expect not to carry a monthly balance, but end up doing
so. These expectations mean customers are less sensitive to interest rate changes than stan-
dard economic theory would predict, and instead focus on other aspects of the credit card
contract.
In a related project, Fritzdixon et al. (2014) surveyed 450 title lending customers to de-
6For a theoretical discussion of self-control problems, see O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) and
O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999).
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termine their time preferences and expectations about the loan.7 We partnered with a large
title lending firm to survey customers at 10 different title lending stores in 3 states. Store
employees offered the survey to all customers who came into the store to take out a loan or
make a payment. The survey included basic demographic questions, as well as questions
designed to elicit the customers’ time and risk preferences. We find that approximately 21
percent of the surveyed customers were present-biased, meaning that they expected to be
more patient in the future, but they will not be. We also found that customers generally
underestimated the time it would take to repay the loan. Together, these results suggest that
some borrowers are making a mistake when they take out a title loan.
Another issue that has been addressed in the literature on financial products in general
is the idea that consumers are less financially sophisticated than the lenders. The contracts
presented to consumers are written in legalese, so they are often difficult for a lay person
to understand. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has mandated disclo-
sure requirements for other products, including mortgages and payday lending, so that the
contracts are more understandable to the typical borrower.8 Currently, title lenders face
few disclosure requirements. Under the federal Truth in Lending Act, they must disclose
the price of the loan as an annual percentage rate (APR). This “price” does not include
fees for late payments, or repossession and storage fees if the vehicle is repossessed. Few
states require additional disclosures. If consumers’ limited attention prevents them from
understanding the terms of the loan contract when they sign it, then they may be entering
contracts that they would prefer not to.
Despite these potential issues with title loans, there are reasons to believe that they
may be better than other comparable forms of alternative credit. First, because the loans
are backed by physical collateral, they typically have lower interest rates than payday
loans. Although pawn loans are also backed by physical collateral, they are generally
7For a more detailed discussion of the survey procedure and results, see Fritzdixon et al. (2014).
8See, for example, the CFPB “Know before you owe” project considering mortgage disclosures.
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/knowbeforeyouowe/
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much smaller than either title loans or payday loans.9
Second, borrowers generally have the ability to pay more than the finance charge when
renewing the loan. Even if they cannot pay the entire principal after one month, they do
have the ability to reduce future interest payments by paying part of the principal when they
renew through a process called prepayment. This is not the case for payday loans or pawn
loans. Third, consumers can only hold one title loan at a time per vehicle. Since the firm
(generally) records a lien against the borrower’s car, he cannot use the same car to secure
another loan at the same time. They may therefore be a better choice among alternative
financial services.
If consumers are completely informed and conform to the rational model, then title
lending (like other loan products) should be unambiguously good for consumers. If bor-
rowers are making mistakes, as the survey in Fritzdixon et al. (2014) suggests, title lending,
however, will reduce consumer welfare.
II.4 Background on title lending
This section provides background on title lending. The first subsection discusses the title
loan process. The second subsection briefly describes the history of title lending in the
United States. A longer discussion is available in the appendix.
II.4.1 Title loan process
One advantage of title loans, at least from the borrower’s perspective, is how quick and
easy it is for a borrower to take out a loan. To obtain a loan, the borrower takes his vehicle
to a title lending store. The lender examines the vehicle, verifies the borrower’s identity
and that he owns the vehicle, and then completes the paperwork to offer the loan to the
borrower. The company either takes possession of the title or places a lien on the vehicle.
Most lenders do not require proof of income or ability to repay the loan. The process
9According to the USA Today, the average pawn loan has doubled to $150 since the economic downturn.
This is still significantly lower than the average title loan, at $500 or the average payday loan, at $325.
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usually takes under an hour, and the borrower leaves with cash in hand. The loans are
modeled after pawn transactions, so they typically last for 30 days. At the end of 30 days,
the borrower can repay the entire loan and complete his transaction, or renew his loan. To
renew, or roll over, the loan, the borrower pays the interest or “finance charge,” and the loan
is renewed for another 30 days. At the end of those 30 days, the borrower can repay the
entire amount of the loan or renew again. Most states require lenders to accept prepayment,
meaning the borrower can pay off the full loan before the 30 days are up, and the borrower
can pay more than the finance charge when he renews the loan. This extra payment is then
used to reduce the principal, which decreases future interest payments even if the loan is
rolled over.
If the borrower does become delinquent on the loan, the title lender has the right to
repossess the vehicle after a waiting period defined by law. States regulate how long the
company must wait before repossessing the vehicle. Additionally, after repossession, the
lender must wait an additional length of time before selling the vehicle. In some states,
the lender is responsible for returning any excess proceeds of the sale to the customer. In
some states, the lender has the right to sue for any delinquencies, even after repossessing
and selling the vehicle.
II.4.2 History of title lending
To establish the history of title lending, I examined the laws in each state to determine when
it was legalized and/or prohibited, either explicitly or through another statute. Starting from
the National Consumer Law Center’s Small Dollar Loan Product Scorecard (Plunkett and
Hurtado, 2011), I determined which states allowed title lending in 2008 and 2010, the
two years for which the scorecard exists. I traced back the authorizing legislation noted
in the scorecard. This allowed me to determine when title lending became implicitly or
explicitly legal in the state. The scorecard only considers one month loans that use the
title as collateral as a title loan. In many states, lenders circumvent legal restrictions on
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title lending by offering longer loans with the same high interest rates. Since one of the
major criticisms of the loans is the cost, I include these types of loans in my definition
of title loans. The introduction of specific authorizing legislation provided information on
many of the states, but not all states specifically pass title lending legislation. Because
title lending grew out of pawnbroking, it often existed in a state long before any statutes
explicitly recognized it as a separate type of loan. To account for the growth of title lending
in the absence of specific legislation, I also checked newspapers for the earliest mention of
title lending in each state, as well as for more general discussions of the industry. From
this research, I created the indicator variable TLLegalst that equals one when title lending
is legal and present in a state. Figure II.1 shows the history of title lending law changes for
the continguous U.S.10
Title lending began as a form of traditional pawnbroking in the early 1990s.11 Because
pawnbrokers were generally not treated as lenders under small loans statutes, they could
charge higher interest rates than other lenders. Title loans were created to take advantage
of this loophole and allow pawnbrokers to make larger loans without needing to store the
vehicle. They appeared first in Southern states before spreading across the country. By the
mid 1990s, they were common across the Southeast and Midwest, and legislatures began
creating laws that recognized them as separate loan products. Most title lending laws that
were passed at this time actually codified favorable rules that the industry itself advocated.
Louisiana and Kentucky were two of the first states to explicitly ban title loans in 1997 and
1998, respectively. By the end of the 1990s, title lending had spread to states in all parts of
the country, although title lending is not currently evenly distributed throughout the coun-
try. The Northeast, in particular, has strong usury laws, and except for New Hampshire, the
Northeastern states prohibits all forms of high interest lending. In the 2000s, many con-
sumer advocates sought to ban title lending in state legislatures, although few states have
actually shut down the industry. Title loans remain uncommon in the Northeast, but there
10Both Alaska and Hawaii have strict interest rate caps, so title lenders do not operate in those states.
11This discussion draws partially from the history in Drysdale and Keest (2000)
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are states that allow title lending in all other regions.12
II.5 Data
The outcomes of interest, annual county bankruptcy filing rates from 1998 to 2012, come
from the Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) database. The database pro-
vides data on the number of bankruptcies filed in each county with each federal court dis-
trict. The data include disaggregated information on both business and personal bankrupt-
cies, broken down into each chapter of bankruptcy. Some district courts accept bankruptcy
filings from overlapping jurisdictions. To obtain the total number of bankruptcy filings per
county, I add up the number of filings in that county from each district.13 The data include
the number of filings in each chapter of bankruptcy. The two types of filing that I consider
in this paper are Ch. 7 and Ch. 13 bankruptcies. Under Ch. 7 bankruptcy, an individual (or
business) surrenders all non-exempt assets to pay back debts, and any debt remaining after
the sale of the assets is immediately discharged. Under Ch. 13 bankruptcy, on the other
hand, the debtor keeps his assets and pays back a portion of his debt out of his income
during a preset repayment period. At the end of the repayment period, the remaining debt
is discharged.
The main independent variable is county access to title lending. The first measure of
access I use depends on whether title lending is legal and available in the state; this is
the variable TLLegalst , defined above. The second measure takes into account that states
determine the regulatory environment in which title loans are governed, so their presence
in a state may be endogenous to other state credit market decisions. To deal with this
endogeneity, I consider only counties in states that prohibit title loans. People who live in
counties that are closer to the border of a state that allows title lending should have better
access to title loans, even though the loans are prohibited in their state of residence. This
12In the Northeast, New Hampshire is the only state that ever allowed title lending. The first stores opened
in 2002, but were then shut down following an interest rate cap that took effect in December, 2008. The rate
cap was subsequently removed in 2012, and title lenders have begun returning to the state.
13For example, both the Northern and Middle federal districts in Alabama accept bankruptcy petitions from
Autauga County.
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is captured by the indicator variable TLAccess25ct , which equals one for counties c whose
center is within 25 miles of a state that allows title lending in year t.14 People who live
farther from the border will not be able to easily obtain a title loan. To obtain this measure,
I used ArcGIS to determine the distance between the center of a county and the nearest
point on neighboring state borders.
I include several different control variables to account for differences in individual and
county propensities for filing for bankruptcy. The county-level economic control variables
include the unemployment rate and the per capita income. These variables control for
economic conditions that could affect the bankruptcy filing rates across counties. I also
include demographic controls, including the racial and ethnic makeup of the county, the
percent male, and the median age.
Table II.1 presents summary statistics on the variables used in this study, broken down
by title lending legality (in Panel A) and title lending access (in Panel B). Counties in states
that allow title lending and counties in states that prohibit title lending are quite similar on
all demographic measures. The only clear difference between the two sets of counties are
in the racial and ethnic breakdowns. Counties where title lending is legal have almost twice
as many black residents and two times as many Hispanic residents.15 Panel B presents the
summary statistics by title lending access. Counties without access have higher populations
and almost half as many black residents as counties with access. Otherwise the two groups
of counties are very similar. Looking at the bankruptcy filing rates, we see that counties
without access have approximately 2 more bankruptcies per 10,000 people than counties
with access, previewing the results from the regressions.
II.6 Empirical analysis
I present three sets of results. First, I provide difference-in-difference regressions using
own-state law changes, which show that access to title loans decreases Ch. 7 personal
14I also perform regressions using other distances as cutoff points; effects are similar to those discussed
here. Results are available upon request.
15This makes sense given the distribution of legal title lending throughout the country.
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bankruptcy filings rates and the overall personal bankruptcy filing rate. Second, I present
similar estimates using neighboring-state law changes to control for the endogenous deci-
sion to allow title lending. These results strengthen the first results that access lowers the
personal bankrutpcy filing rate. Finally, I provide preliminary evidence that people do cross
state lines to obtain a title loan.
II.6.1 Regressions using legality of title lending
To begin with, I present results on difference-in-difference estimates using the decision to
allow title lending in a state. These regressions compare the bankruptcy rates in states that
legalized and gained title lending with states that did not change their laws before and after
the policy change. The regression is presented in equation II.1
bcst = β0 +β1TLLegalst + γXct +ηc+δt + εcst (II.1)
where bcst represents one of several bankruptcy filing rates for county c in state s and year
t; Xct is a vector of county level controls that vary over time, used in some of the regres-
sions; and ηc and δt are county and year fixed effects, respectively.16 The key independent
variable is TLLegalst which is the interaction term for being in a state that allowed title
lending after the legislation was changed.
The results show that title lending legality does appear to reduce the bankruptcy filing
rate. Table II.2 presents the results of these regressions for the different bankruptcy filing
rates that I consider. These regressions all include county demographic controls as well as
county and year fixed effects. The first column presents results using all personal bankrupt-
cies filed. The coefficient is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that legal title
loans decrease the overall bankruptcy filing rate. From a mean overall personal filing rate
16The economic controls include the per capita income, unemployment rate, and population. The de-
mographic controls include the percent male, median age, and racial and ethnic breakdowns. The racial
breakdown is the percent white, percent black, percent Native American, percent Asian, and percent Native
Hawaiian/Pacific Islander. The ethnic breakdown is the percent Hispanic, regardless of race. The controls
also include a dummy variable for being near the border of any state.
49
of 32.07, the coefficient represents a 3.65 percent decrease in the personal bankruptcy fil-
ing rate. The next two column show that the decrease is driven by a decrease in Ch. 7
bankruptcy filing but not Ch. 13 filings.17 The coefficient on TLLegal for Ch. 13 filings is
statistically insignificant. On the other hand, counties where title lending is legal have 1.46
fewer Ch. 7 personal bankruptcy filings per 10,000 people after the law change compared
to counties in states that do not change their laws, a decrease of 6.3 percent from the na-
tional average. We see a similar result in column 4, which presents the results for all Ch. 7
bankruptcy filings. This suggests that title lending may decrease Ch. 7 filings, in which a
borrower surrenders his assets, but not Ch. 13 filings.
The final column of Table II.2 presents results for all business bankruptcies as a fal-
sification exercise. Some proponents argue that many title loan customers are small busi-
ness owners,18 so it is possible that they could file for a business bankruptcy. This only
makes sense if the business is structured as a limited liability corporation (LLC), and most
small businesses are sole proprietorships or general partnerships.19 In these cases, personal
bankruptcy better protects the business owner. We would therefore expect that there should
be no effect of title lending access on business bankruptcy filing rates. There is a small,
statistically significant effect on business bankruptcy filings.
II.6.2 Regressions using cross-border title lending access
Results using own-state law changes may be biased because the regulatory decision to
allow or prohibit title lending is made simultaneously with other decisions on the credit
market regulations within the state. States also choose several rules governing bankruptcy,
including the size of exemptions, that may be correlated with the decision to allow title
lending. Thus, simply comparing the change in bankruptcy rates for counties in states that
17This analysis does not address the reason that Ch. 7 filings, but not Ch. 13 filings, fall. There are
interesting strategic consideration about chapter selection, but they are beyond the scope of this paper.
18See, for example, Zywicki (2010).
19The Small Business Administration states that over 70 percent of small businesses are sole pro-
prietorships. See http://www.sba.gov/community/blogs/sole-proprietorship%E2%80%94-popular-business-
structure-right-you
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gain title lending and the change in counties in states that prohibit title lending may lead to
biased estimators of the effect of title loans.
To evaluate the size of this bias and better identify the effect of access to title lending
on bankruptcy rates, I focus my analysis on counties in states that prohibit title loans and
compare counties that are close to the border of a state that allows title lending with counties
farther from the border. People who live in counties close to the border of a state that allows
title lending can cross the border to obtain a loan, whereas households farther from the
border will have a more difficult time obtaining a loan. By using counties within the state, I
eliminate differences in bankruptcy filing rates caused by state regulations. All regressions
also include county and year fixed effects to allow a difference-in-difference interpretation.
I run a difference-in-difference specification that regresses the county bankruptcy rate
on various economic and demographic controls and an indicator TLAccessct for whether
county c has access to title lending in year t by being within 25 miles of a state that allows
title lending. I also include county and year fixed effects to capture county level differ-
ences and time trends. The regression is similar to the one used above, but now the main
independent variable is TLAccessct :
bcst = β0 +β1TLAccessct + γXct +ηc+δt + εcst (II.2)
where bcst represents one of the bankruptcy filing rates for county c in state s and year
t; TLAccessct is the indicator variable described above; Xct is a vector of county level
controls; and ηc and δt are county and year fixed effects, respectively.
The results show a similar pattern as the regressions using title lending legality. Ta-
ble II.3 presents the results from these regressions. The first column presents the results
for the overall personal filing rate. Now the coefficient on the main independent variable,
TLAccess25, is negative and significant. From a mean personal bankruptcy filing rate of
32.07 bankruptcies per 10,000 people, the coefficient of -0.964 on TLAccess represents a
decrease of 3.0 percent. For Ch. 13 and Ch. 7 personal filings, we see the same pattern
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as we did using legality as our measure of access to title loans. The coefficient for Ch. 13
bankruptcies is positive, but not statistically significant. The coefficient for Ch. 7 bankrupt-
cies remains negative and statistically significant. The coefficient of -1.23 represents a 5.3
percent decrease in the filing rate from a mean of 23.15 filings per 10,000 people. This
suggests that the results using legality may be biased upward and that the main effect of
title lending access is on decreasing Ch. 7 bankruptcy filing rates.
Column (5) presents regressions using the business filing rate as a falsification. The
coefficient on TLAccess25 is still small, but now it is insignificant, as expected.
II.6.3 Evidence of cross-border use of title lending
The interpretation of the results using distance to a state that allows title lending as the
measure of access rests on the ability of borrowers to obtain title loans across state lines.
Because there is so little information available on title loan customers, it is not possible
to verify that cross-border title loan borrowing has occurred throughout the entire time
period I am studying. There are, however, data available for the last nine years from the
National Financial Capability Survey (NFCS) that allow me to look at whether people are
crossing state borders to obtain a title loan. The NFCS is a large study sponsored by FINRA
Investor Education Fund to determine the financial literacy of Americans and document
their financial behaviors. It was conducted in two rounds, in 2009 and 2012. In addition
to standard financial literacy questions, the survey also asks respondents about their use
of several alternative financial products, including title loans. Specifically, the survey asks
respondents whether they have used a title loan in the last five years.
The survey results lend support to the idea that customers do indeed cross state lines to
obtain a title loan. Table II.4 presents results from this question. Panel A breaks down the
responses by whether the state in which the borrower lives allows title lending. Unsurpris-
ingly, people in states that allow title lending are significantly more likely to use title loans;
7.46 percent of respondents in title lending states have used a title loan in the past 5 years
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versus 5.82 percent of respondents in non-title lending states. This difference is significant
at the 0.01 level. Since people in non-title lending states are taking out title loans, this may
mean that title lending prohibitions are not binding. The second part of Panel A, discussed
below, addresses this issue.
Panel B breaks down the respondents in states that prohibit title lending by whether
their state borders a state that allows title lending. In this case, a higher proportion of
respondents near states that allow title lending have used a title loan in the past 5 years than
in states that do not border a state that allows title loans (6.13 percent versus 5.17 percent).
The sample size is smaller, so this result is only significant at the 0.15 level.
One issue with these data in answering this question is that he survey asks respondents
if they have used a title loan in the past 5 years. People may have moved into the state dur-
ing those 5 years, but I can separately identify those who have lived in the same place for
5 years, as long as they own their home. The respondents who are homeowners were also
asked when they had purchased their home. This allows me to consider only respondents
who have lived in the same state for the past five years. This comes at the expense, how-
ever, of the size and generality of the respondents. Homeowners are likely to have higher
income as well as higher wealth. This means that they are less likely to take out a title loan
compared to the full sample. Indeed, while the same general pattern remains in each panel,
the difference is no longer significant.
There is also some anecdotal evidence that suggests that crossing state borders to obtain
a title loan is quite common. Pennsylvania State Rep. Mark Cohen has warned Pennsylva-
nia residents about taking out loans from Delaware lenders (Anonymous, 2009). Maryland
and Washington, D.C. successfully lobbied for Virginia to prevent its lenders from making
loans to non-Virginian residents, although that ban was overturned less than a year later. In
2007, Indiana added a statute that said all loans to Indiana residents were regulated under
Indiana law, no matter where the loan contract was made. An Illinois lender sued to pre-
vent this statute from being enforced, and both the district and circuit court ruled this statute
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was unconstitutional.20 Illinois lenders continued to make loans to Indiana residents. This
anecdotal evidence suggests that borrowers do cross state lines to obtain loans when they
are prohibited in their home states, lending support to my identification strategy.
II.7 Conclusion
This paper examines the effect of title lending access on bankruptcy filing rates using
PACER data on annual county bankruptcy filing rates. The empirical specifications exploit
the many legal changes that have occurred over the time period to perform a difference-in-
difference analysis of title lending access. The second empirical specification also exploits
the idea that borrowers can cross state lines to obtain a title loan when title lending is pro-
hibited in their home state. I use this geographic variation in access to title lending and
changes in state laws to estimate the effect of title lending access on bankruptcy rates. Re-
sults from the regressions show that access to title lending decreases the bankruptcy filing
rate, in particular the Ch. 7 personal bankruptcy filing rate.
The regression results suggest that access to title lending decreases bankruptcy filing
rates, even after controlling for economic and demographic characteristics. This finding is
in contrast to the arguments generally presented by title lending opponents that title loans
drive consumers to financial ruin. On average, title lending access seems to allow customers
to smooth their consumption over income or consumption shocks. These results support
the neoclassical model of consumer credit. Access to credit, even very expensive credit like
title loans, seems to benefit consumers.
One limitation of this study is that it does not use information on who actually obtains
a title loan. Instead I focus on whether counties have access to title lending because data
on who borrow is not currently available. Future work should focus on identifying actual
title lending customers and examining their experiences. On the other hand, it may be that
access to title loans affects other credit opportunities in the state by increasing competition
for small dollar loans. In that case, my results would capture these knock-on effects, which
20Midwest Title Loans, Inc. v. Mills, 593 F.3d 660 (7th Cir. 2010)
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would not be captured in studies that only considered title loan users.
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Table II.1: Summary statistics
PANEL A:
Title Lending Legal Title Lending Prohibited
All bankruptcies 33.33 32.43
All business bankruptcies 0.99 1.10
All personal Bankruptcies 32.33 31.33
Home price appreciation index 175.59 180.62
Population 90,934 102,222
Per capita income 27.09 29.40
Unemployment rate 6.21 5.99
Percent male 49.74 49.70
Median age 38.05 39.31
Percent white 81.12 87.88
Percent black 11.44 6.40
Percent Am. Indian 1.74 1.46
Percent Asian 0.88 0.93
Percent Hawaiian/Pacific Islander 0.05 0.04
Percent two or more races 1.54 1.67
Percent hispanic 9.55 4.42
N 21,572 19,765
PANEL B:
Access No access
All bankruptcies 30.85 32.73
All business bankruptcies 1.12 1.10
All personal Bankruptcies 29.73 31.63
Home price appreciation index 185.35 179.69
Population 71,292 108,411
Per capita income 28.75 29.56
Unemployment rate 6.08 5.97
Percent male 49.57 49.74
Median age 39.56 39.29
Percent white 84.05 89.03
Percent black 9.82 5.36
Percent Am. Indian 1.96 1.35
Percent Asian 0.78 0.96
Percent Hawaiian/Pacific Islander 0.04 0.03
Percent two or more races 1.75 1.64
Percent hispanic 4.43 4.42
N 3,835 15,811
Notes: This table reports summary statistics on the independent and dependent
variables in this study. Source: author’s calculations from Public Access to Court
Electronic Records (PACER) database, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and Bureau of
Economic Analysis.
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Table II.2: Regressions using title lending legality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Personal Bankruptcies Ch.13 Personal Bankruptcies Ch.7 Personal Bankruptcies All Ch.7 Bankruptcies All Business Bankrupcties
Legal -1.173* 0.290 -1.460*** -1.570*** -0.0836*
(0.460) (0.178) (0.360) (0.368) (0.0404)
N 42730 42730 42730 42730 42730
adj. R-sq 0.483 0.655 0.484 0.481 0.205
Notes: This table presents the results of OLS regression of county bankruptcy filings rates on an indicator variable for title lending legality, county
level controls, and county and year fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered at the county level, are presented in parentheses below the coefficients. *
p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.
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Table II.3: Regressions using cross-border access
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Personal Bankruptcies Ch.13 Personal Bankruptcies Ch.7 Personal Bankruptcies All Ch.7 Bankruptcies All Business Bankrupcties
TLAccess -0.964* -1.232** 0.272 -1.261** -0.00167
-0.482 -0.382 -0.193 -0.391 -0.0395
N 42330 42330 42330 42330 42330
adj. R-sq 0.483 0.656 0.485 0.481 0.205
Notes: This table presents the results of OLS regression of county bankruptcy filings rates on an indicator variable for title lending access, county
level controls, and county and year fixed effects. Access here is defined as being within 25 miles on a state that allows title loans or in a state that
allows title loans. Standard errors, clustered at the county level, are presented in parentheses below the coefficients. * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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Table II.4: Have you used a title loan in the past 5 years?
PANEL A:
Title Lending Legal Title Lending Prohibited Difference
All Respondents
Yes 0.0746 0.0582 0.0164***
n 48701 3180
5 year residents
Yes 0.0545 0.0490 0.0055
n 20,301 1,346
PANEL B:
Borders a TL state Does not border a TL state Difference
All Respondents
Yes 0.0613 0.0517 0.0096*
n 2136 1044
5 year residents
Yes 0.0522 0.0433 0.0089
n 861 485
Notes: This table presents the results of an equal proportions test on the propor-
tion of respondents in the National Financial Capability Survey who reported
using an auto title loan in the past 5 years. * p<.15; ** p<.10; *** p<.01
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CHAPTER III
The effect of title loan access on financial hardship
III.1 Introduction
Auto title loans are short-term, high-interest loans in which a borrower uses his auto title as
collateral for the loan. These loans are mostly used by people with either low income or bad
credit who do not have access to traditional credit markets. Because the loans carry interest
rates as high as 300 percent on an annualized basis and use one of the customer’s most
valuable assets as collateral, critics of the loan argue that they are particularly harmful
to customers. They contend that the loans have devastating consequences for borrowers
because they may lose their vehicle as a results of being unable to repay the loan.
There is evidence, however, that these consequences are fairly uncommon. Reposses-
sion rates are lower than often claimed (Fritzdixon et al. (2014)), and, as shown in the last
chapter, access to title loans does not increase the bankruptcy filing rate.
Vehicle repossession and filing for bankruptcy, however, are extreme negative out-
comes. It may be that the critics are right that the loans carry negative financial con-
sequences for borrowers without pushing them into bankruptcy. A customer may delay
paying other bills in order to repay the title loan so that he is able to keep his car. Thus, title
loans may harm consumers without causing them to lose their vehicle or file for bankruptcy.
The theoretical welfare implications of title lending are ambiguous. High-risk con-
sumers are often shut out of traditional lending markets because lending to these groups is
too costly for banks and credit card issuers. Alternative financial services like title loans
can then fill a gap in the credit market. Under the neoclassical view, title loans would
then allow customers to smooth consumption in response to liquidity shocks. Under the
behavioral economics view, however, customers could suffer from common behavioral bi-
ases. These biases would imply that some customers are making a mistake when using title
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loans and would be better off without the loans. Because there is no clear understanding of
behavioral biases among title lending customers, the effect of these loans on customers is
an open empirical question.
To examine the effect of access to title lending on less extreme measures of financial
hardship, I use geographical variation in access to title loans to estimate the impact on
ten measures of individual and household financial hardship. States choose whether to
allow title loans, so comparing households in states the allow title lending with households
in states that prohibit title lending may lead to biased estimates of its effects. To avoid
this problem, I adopt a new approach. Focusing only on households located in states that
prohibit title loans, I compare households in counties near the border of a state that does
allow title lending with households farther away from the border.1
The key outcomes in this study come from the Urban Institute’s National Survey of
America’s Families (NSAF). The NSAF is a survey of over 100,000 individuals that was
administered in 13 states in three rounds, gathering detailed data on low-income families
and children. Importantly for my work, the survey asked several questions about financial
strain: whether a member of the family had to delay several types of medical care because
of an inability to pay; whether the family had trouble paying rent or their mortgage; suffered
from food insecurity; or had their telephone service cut. The answers to these questions
become my measures of financial hardship.
While theory does not offer a clear implication on whether title loans benefit or harm
consumers, I find evidence that title lending is generally not important for the financial
situation of households. My results show that access to title loans has no effect on the
measures of financial hardship. This result holds under multiple specifications, so it does
not appear to be a result of the chosen empirical strategy. This holds true even when looking
at respondents who are more likely to use title loans, either because of their age, income,
1This approach is used in Melzer (2011) to study the impact of payday lending on the same measures of
consumer well-being. It is also used in Carter (2012) to examine the interaction between payday lending and
pawnshop usage, and in Bhutta (2014) to study the effect of payday lending on credit scores, delinquencies,
and overdrafts.
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or car ownership. On average, there appears to be no effect of access to title loans on
household’s financial well-being. This could be because the loans are too small to have a
measurable effect of a household’s financial well-being or because they affect customers
differently based on the importance of their behavioral biases.
Title lending is increasingly replacing payday lending as a form of high-interest alter-
native credit as more and more states place bans or prohibitive price caps on payday loans.
My results will better inform the changing landscape of state (and potentially federal) reg-
ulation of title lending. Outright bans on title loans are probably not warranted, since there
is no definitive evidence that they consistently harm consumers.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section III.2 discusses previous work on
title lending and alternative financial services (AFS) in general. Section III.2.1 presents the
conflicting theoretical implications of title lending. Section III.3 summarizes the history
of title lending in the United States. Section III.4 discusses the data used and Section III.5
explains the empirical method used to identify the effects of title lending. Section III.6
presents my main results. Section III.7 presents several robustness checks of my main
results. Finally, Section III.8 concludes.
III.2 Related literature
In this section I describe the existing literature on alternative financial services. The re-
search generally focuses on payday lending, another short-term, high-interest loan product,
not title lending. Additionally, estimates of the effect of payday loans on consumer out-
comes are mixed.
Three papers find positive effects of payday lending on consumer financial outcomes.
Morse (2009) finds that access to payday lending after a natural disaster led to fewer fore-
closures and fewer larcenies. Zinman (2010) finds that consumers in Oregon, which capped
rates on payday lending, experience more adverse financial outcomes than consumers in
Washington, which did not. Edmiston (2011) finds that counties where payday lending is
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banned have more people with credit scores in the bottom 5% of the overall distribution
than counties where payday lending is allowed. Additionally, Bhutta et al. (2012) link ad-
ministrative data from a payday lender to credit reports and find that receiving a payday
loan has no effect on a customer’s credit score or other measures of financial health in the
long run.
On the other hand, several papers find negative effects of payday lending on consumer
outcomes. Carrell and Zinman (2008) find that access to payday loans decreases several
measures of military personnel performance. They exploit the exogenous assignment of
airmen to bases in the United States and find that the likelihood of having a poor perfor-
mance measure increased once airmen were stationed at a base where payday lending was
legal. Using a regression discontinuity design, Skiba and Tobacman (2009) find that bor-
rowers whose subprime credit score is just above the payday loan cutoff, and therefore
receive a loan, are more likely to file for bankruptcy in the next two years than borrowers
who are just below the cutoff. The most closely related paper to this one is Melzer (2011),
who uses the same data used in this study. He finds that access to payday lending increased
the likelihood of experiencing financial hardship, particularly for the target payday lending
population. Thus the payday lending literature is still mixed on the effect of small-dollar
loans on consumer outcomes.
There is a smaller literature on title lending specifically, although it exists mainly in the
legal literature. Zywicki (2010) was the one of the first law papers to specifically address
title lending and is based mostly on conversations with title lenders. Zywicki argues that
title lending serves as an important source of credit for lower income individuals and small
business owners who are not able to get traditional bank credit. He cites an Illinois report
that finds that 77% of title lending customers do not have a credit card to provide evidence
that these borrowers do not use traditional consumer lending. If title lending were banned,
these borrowers would turn to more expensive or more dangerous forms of credit, like
loansharking. Using data from Illinois and Tennessee, he finds that repossession rates
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are between 3.2% and 8%. Hawkins (2012) also presents a generally positive view of
title loans. He examines state regulatory reports and argues that lenders do not typically
repossess a borrower’s vehicle, and so the main claim of critics is incorrect. Citing data
from multiple regulatory reports, he finds that repossession rates range from a low of 0.00%
in Oregon in 20082 to a high of 13.06% in Tennessee in 2007. He argues that borrowers
seem to be overoptimistic about their ability to repay, which calls for specific disclosure
laws, but not stringent regulations or outright bans.
Martin and Adams (2012) take a much more negative view of title lending. They argue
that title lending companies take advantage of customers, getting them to pay an exorbitant
amount of interest before ultimately repossessing their car. Using data from New Mexico
state regulators, they argue that lenders want to trap borrowers in a cycle of debt where
they only pay interest fees months after month, and that a large proportion of borrowers
end up having their vehicles repossessed by lenders. New Mexico does not collect data on
the number of loans made per year, but using multiple estimation steps, they calculate that
up to 60% of customers lose their vehicle. They believe that title lending should be heavily
regulated, if not banned outright.
The existing title lending literature only focuses on one outcome: losing one’s car.
While this is certainly an important possible outcome of using a title loan, it is clear that
customers could be affected by the loans even if they do not lose their vehicle. This paper
will specifically address the possibility of less severe measures of financial hardship.
III.2.1 Theory
The theoretical welfare implications of title lending are unclear. High-risk consumers are
often shut out of traditional lending markets because lending to these groups is too costly
for banks and credit card issuers. Alternative financial services like title loans can then fill
a gap in the credit market. Title loans could allow consumers to smooth consumption in
light of shocks to income or consumption. Under the neoclassical model, consumers would
2This represents 1 repossession out of 10,136 loans.
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rationally choose to take out a title loan and would therefore be better off (or no worse off
if they choose not to take out a loan).
On the other hand, borrowers may be incorrectly choosing these loans because of be-
havioral biases, like self-control or overoptimism problems.3 If customers suffer from
self-control problems, then they may take out a loan expecting to save to repay it, but will
not save. Then they would be better off not taking out the loan. Similarly, they may be
overoptimistic about their ability to repay the loans, and so they will hold the loan longer
and pay more interest than they planned to.
Studies of alternative financial services customers have shown that some customers
do display these biases. Bertrand and Morse (2011) look at information disclosures in
the payday lending market and find that behaviorally motivated disclosure of the costs of
the loans caused customers to decrease the number of times that they renewed the loan.
Mann (2013) surveys customers of a payday lending firm and finds that 40% of customers
incorrectly predict how long they will hold their payday loan. In an analysis of the credit
card market, a part of the traditional lending sector, Ausubel (1991) argues that incorrect
consumer expectations about whether they will carry a balance drive the credit card firms’
supernormal profits. These expectations mean that customers are less sensitive to interest
rates changes than they rationally would be expected to be and instead focus on other
aspects of the credit card contract.
In a related project, Fritzdixon et al. (2014) survey 450 title lending customers to de-
termine their time preferences and expectations about the loan.4 We partnered with a large
title lending firm to survey customers at 10 different title lending stores in 3 states. The
survey included basic demographic questions, as well as questions designed to elicit the
customers’ time and risk preferences. We find that approximately 21% of the surveyed
customers were present-biased, meaning that they expect to be more patient in the future
3For a theoretical discussion of self-control problems, see O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) and
O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999).
4For a more detailed discussion of the survey procedure and results, see Fritzdixon et al. (2014).
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that they actually are. We also find that, compared to industry average, customers generally
underestimated the time it will take to repay their loan. Together, these results suggest that
at least some borrowers have common behavioral biases and are making a mistake when
they take out a title loan.
If consumers are completely informed and conform to the rational model, then title
lending, and high-interest credit in generally, should be unambiguously good for con-
sumers. If customers have common behavioral biases and are making mistakes, as the
survey in Fritzdixon et al. (2014) suggests, title lending, however, will reduce consumer
welfare.
III.3 Background information
III.3.1 Title lending process
One advantage of title loans is how quick and easy it is for a borrower to take out a loan. To
obtain a loan, the borrower takes his vehicle to a title lending store. The lender examines the
vehicle, verifies the borrower’s identity and that he owns the vehicle, and then completes the
paperwork to offer the loan to the borrower. Most lenders do not require proof of income or
ability to repay the loan, although at least one major chain does require a minimum income
to obtain a loan.5 The process usually takes under an hour, and the borrower leaves with
cash in hand. The loans are modeled after pawn transactions, so they last for 30 days. At
the end of 30 days, the borrower can repay the entire loan and complete his transaction, or
renew his loan. To renew, or rollover, the loan, the borrower pays the interest or finance
charge, and the loan is renewed for another 30 days. At the end of those 30 days, the
borrower can repay the entire amount of the loan or renew again. Most states require
lenders to accept prepayment, meaning the borrower can pay off the full loan before the
30 days are up, and the borrower can pay more than the finance charge when he renews
the loan. This extra payment is then used to reduce the principal, which decreases future
5TitleMax requires a minimum income level. As a result of this, they offer significantly lower interest
rates. In Tennessee, for example, they advertise that they have the “Lowest rates! Up to 50% less!”
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interest payments even when the loan is rolled over.
III.3.2 History of title lending
I establish the history of title lending by examining the laws in each state and newspaper
articles. In states with title lending statute, I can identify when title lending was explicitly
legalized or prohibited. Title lending grew out of pawnbroking, so lenders often operated
in a state before the loans were explicitly authorized. To determine when this occurred, I
searched the Proquest database of newspapers for the first mention of title loans in the state.
From this work, I created a variable for when title lending was legal and present in a state.
Title lending grew out of traditional pawnbroking in the early 1990s.6 Pawnbrokers
were generally not treated as lenders under small loans statutes, so they could charge higher
interest rates than traditional lenders. Title loans were created to take advantage of this
loophole and allow pawnbrokers to make larger loans. The survey used in this study, dis-
cussed more in Section III.4, was conducted in 13 states: Alabama, California, Colorado,
Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, Texas,
Washington, Wisconsin. I describe the history of title lending in these states during the time
period of study (1997-2002) here. Details on other states are available in the appendix.
Four states, Alabama, California, Mississippi, and Texas allow title lending throughout
the entire time period. In California and Texas, lenders operate through loopholes. These
loopholes are discussed more in the appendix.
Additionally, seven states prohibit title lending throughout the time period. Colorado,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, and Washington have strict
interest rate caps that prevent title lenders from operating profitably in these states. 7
Florida was the only state to change their title lending status during the time period.
Florida was one of the early homes of title lending, but effectively banned the loans in
6This discussion draws partially from the history in Drysdale and Keest (2000).
7See the appendix for details on these laws.
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2000 with strict interest rate cap of 30 percent. 8
III.4 Data
The key outcomes in this study come from the Urban Institute’s National Survey of Amer-
ica’s Families (NSAF). The NSAF is a large survey that was administered in 13 states over
three rounds in 1997, 1999, and 2002, to gather detailed data on low income families and
children.9 It includes several questions that measure financial hardship. In particular, the
survey asks whether members of the family have had to delay several forms of medical
care because of an inability to pay; had trouble paying their rent or mortgage because of a
lack of money; had their telephone service cut; or suffered from food insecurity. The ques-
tions about delaying care were asked about individuals, whereas the questions about rent
or mortgage payments, food insecurity, and telephone service were asked about the entire
household. In addition to the survey questions themselves, I also create two summary hard-
ship measures. I generate a new measure of whether the person delayed any type of care
because he could not afford it, as well as a measure of whether the household suffered any
of the hardships. DelayCare is a dummy variable equal to one if the individual answered
yes to any of the questions about delaying care. HHHardship is a dummy variable equal
to one if the household has experienced any of the household level hardships in the past
year. The answers to these questions are a clear measure of financial hardship. They are
particularly useful because we would expect that if borrowers were rationally taking out
the loans to smooth consumption, we should see fewer cases of these hardship outcomes.
The NSAF data also contain many control variables, including race, age, education, and
immigration and employment status, which I use in my regressions. They include county
identifiers for almost half of those surveyed and information on household car ownership
8Fla. Stat. §537.011(1)
9The survey states are: Alabama, California, Colorado, Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin. It was administered in 1997, 1999, and
2002. While some households were surveyed in multiple years, it is not a true panel.
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for over 85% of those surveyed.10 These data allow me to use the geographic variation in
access to title lending and household differences in car ownership to estimate the impact of
title lending.
Table III.1 presents summary statistics for the survey sample, comparing individuals
and households in counties that have access to title loans to those in counties that do not
have access. The two samples are fairly similar, but there are some important differences
between them. There are more white individuals and fewer black and Hispanic individuals
in counties that have access than in counties that do not. People with access are also slightly
more likely to have a high school diploma or GED than people without access. They are
more likely to be US born citizens. Despite these differences, the two groups experienced
financial hardship at similar rates. Households with access have a higher income than
households without access, and they are more likely to own a car and to own a house. These
should make hardship less likely for families with access, so it is important to control for
these differences in my regressions.
To account for economic conditions in the household’s county of residence, I include
controls from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and the
2000 Census. These controls include the county population, median income, percent urban,
and unemployment rate. Table III.2 presents summary statistics for these county level
controls. In many ways, the counties are very similar. Both sets of counties are equally
urban, and have a similar proportion of men and approximately the same median age.
There are also some clear differences between the counties without access to title loans and
counties with access. Counties with access are larger, with higher unemployment and lower
per capita income. It is important that I control for these differences in my regressions
because income and unemployment are clearly related to the likelihood of experiencing
financial hardship.
10To preserve anonymity, the Urban Institute only provides county identifiers for households in counties
with more than 250,000 people.
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III.5 Empirical Method
Because states choose to allow title lending, I cannot simply compare the responses from
households in states that allow title lending to the responses from states that do not allow
title lending. To deal with this endogeneity problem, I restrict my analysis to households
in states that prohibit title lending. Focusing on states that prohibit title loans, I compare
households close to the border of a state that allows title loans with households farther from
the border. People who live closer to the border should have better access to title loans, even
though the loans are prohibited in their state of residence. This is captured by the indicator
variable TLAccessct , which equals one for counties c whose center is within 25 miles of a
state that allows title lending in year t. 11
Additionally I check whether the effect varies based on whether the household owns a
car. Households without cars should not have access to title lending even if they live near
the border of a state that allows title loans.
This strategy relies on people crossing state borders to obtain loans when they live in
states that prohibit title lending. I do not have data on the locations of title lenders during the
survey period so I cannot analyze the extent to which this occurred. Anecdotal evidence,
however, suggests that crossing state borders to obtain a title loan is quite common. As
discussed in the last chapter, there is evidence of cross-border loans from Delaware firms
to Pennsylvania residents; from Virginia firms to Maryland and D.C. residents; and from
Illinois firms to Indiana residents.
The main specification follows a linear probability form:
Yicst = β0 +β1TLAccessct +Borderct +δXct + γZit +ηst + εicst (III.1)
where Yicst is a dummy variable for individual or household i in county c and state s who
experiences one of the hardship outcomes in year t; TLAccessct is the dummy variable
11I have repeated the analysis with other distance, and the results are generally consistent with the ones
presented here.
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defined above; Borderc is a dummy variable that equals one when the county is within 25
miles of the border of any state; Xct is a vector of county level controls; and Zit is a vector of
individual or household control variables. Each regression also includes state by year fixed
effects. The key coefficient is β1, the effect of being near the border of state that allows
title loans on the probability of experiencing the hardship measure.
The county controls are the population, median income, percent urban, and unemploy-
ment rate. For the individual outcomes (delaying care), the controls are age, race, ethnicity,
immigrant status, education, whether the individual has health insurance, whether the fam-
ily owns or rents its house or apartment, and whether anyone in his family receives food
stamps. For the household outcomes, the controls are the average adult age, household
race and ethnicity, household immigrant status (dummy =1 if any adult is an immigrant),
homeownership, past year family unemployment spells, and education level of the most
educated adult.
III.6 Results
The regression results for the main specification are presented in Table III.3. Standard
errors, clustered at the county level, are reported below the coefficients. Each regression
includes the individual or household and county controls described above, but the coeffi-
cients on these terms are not shown for ease of interpretation. Panel A presents results for
the individual measures of financial hardship. Panel B presents the results for the house-
hold level measures. The coefficient on TLAccessct is not significant for any of the mea-
sures of financial hardship. Additionally. the sign of the coefficient is not consistent across
measures, suggesting that there is not a consistent effect of title lending on a household’s
financial well-being.
I also perform probit regressions, with the estimated coefficients presented in Table
III.4. While the probit regressions require stronger assumptions on the error terms, they
have other benefits. The estimated dependent variables will all be between zero and one,
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and the marginal effects are allowed to vary. These regressions show the same general
pattern of results. The coefficient on title loan access is statistically significant for one only
measure: whether the household had their telephone service cut because they could not
pay. These results suggest that title loans do not have an impact on the financial well-being
of borrowers.
III.7 Robustness Checks
The main results suggest that title lending does not have a significant effect on these ten
measures of financial hardship. I perform several robustness checks to show that this lack
of effect is consistent when focusing on closer comparison groups and people more likely
to use title loans.
In Table III.5, I present results with the sample restricted to counties whose center is
within 50 miles of the border of a state that allows title loans. These counties should be
more similar to border counties than ones that are farther from the border. There is a similar
pattern of results for this sample, with only Cut phone service and Worried food won’t last
being significant.
I also restrict the sample to people who are most likely to use title loans across several
covariates and rerun the regressions. Because borrowers must own their vehicles outright,
they tend to be older than borrowers of other alternative loan products. Using results from
the survey of title loan customers in Fritzdixon et al. (2014), I determine the age distribution
of title loan borrowers. I restrict my sample of individuals to those within the middle 50%
of the distribution and rerun the individual level regressions. These results are presented
in Table III.6. None of the coefficients on TLAccessct are significant. In addition, the
signs are not all consistent with the main specification. Both Delay medical care and Delay
medication purchase flip signs.
Next, I restrict my sample based on income. Title loans are generally only used by
lower income individuals, so I restrict my sample to households with incomes below the
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sample median. In the NSAF sample I analyze, this is an income of $48,853. The results
are presented in Table III.7. In this specification, none of the coefficients on TLAccessct are
significant. Fox and Guy (2005) report that 70% of Missouri title lending customers make
below $25,000 a year, so I also consider only borrowers with income below this level.12
Table III.8 presents those results. The coefficient for Delay dental care is now significant
and positive., but the rest of the coefficients are insignificant.
I also present results splitting the sample into those who own vehicles and those who do
not. If we see significant results for people and households who do not own cars, then these
results must be driven by something other than access to title loans.13 Table III.9 presents
the results for car owners. None of the coefficients are significant, and 2 of them have a
different sign than in the main specification. Table III.10 presents the results for household
and individuals who do not own a vehicle. The coefficient on TLAccess for Trouble paying
rent is significant, but the rest remain insignificant.
Together, these robustness checks suggest that there is no effect of title lending access
on the probability of experiencing these measures of financial hardship.
III.8 Conclusion
In this paper, I used data from the National Survey of America’s Families to determine
whether access to title loans has an effect of consumer finances. Focusing on households
that lived in states that prohibit title lending, I compared households near the border of a
state that allows title lending to those farther from the border. My results show that title
lending is not significant in explaining differences in the probability of experiencing most
of the financial hardships in the survey.
On average, there appears to be no effect of access to title loans on household’s financial
12While the data from Missouri are probably not exactly comparable to the averages from all title lending
customers, they do provide a rough guide. Other state regulatory reports also find that the average customer’s
income is below $25,000. See Fox and Guy (2005).
13I use all respondents in the main results because owning a car is both a condition of obtaining a loan
and a possible outcome of the loan. If a respondent had previously lost his car because of the loan, any other
negative outcomes would not be captured in regressions that only use car owners.
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well-being. This could be because the loans are too small to have a measurable effect of
a household’s financial well-being or because they effect customers differently based on
the importance of their behavioral biases. Respondents with income below $25,000 also
show no effect of access to title lending, which suggests that this one measure of financial
vulnerability does not lead to differential effects. Future research should disentangle these
two effects.
The lack of effect may be because people have access to other high interest loan prod-
ucts. For example, payday lending was legal in many of the states during the time period
studied. Although they draw from slightly different populations (title lenders require a bor-
rower to own his car outright, while payday lenders require proof of employment), there is
probably significant crossover between the two groups. Future research should also control
for access to payday lending.
The insignificance of title loans for hardships may also be because of differential effects
over time. In the short run, title loans should help consumers avoid the financial hardships
covered by this survey. This does not mean that critics are incorrect however. In the long
run, title loans may make it more difficult for borrowers to afford these other expenses,
and we would expect to see an increase in the probability of experiencing these hardships
where title loans are available. If these two outcomes are offsetting each other in the survey
responses, then we would see no effect of title lending on measures of hardship. Future
work should explore the long-term effects of title loan usage.
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Table III.1: Summary statistics
No access Title Loan Access
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Individual Characteristics:
Outcomes:
Delay medical care 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.31
Delay dental care 0.17 0.38 0.19 0.39
Delay medication purchases 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.25
Delay any form of care 0.15 0.36 0.17 0.37
Controls:
Male 0.46 0.50 0.47 0.50
Age 39.54 11.20 39.39 11.45
Hispanic 0.12 0.32 0.04 0.19
White 0.83 0.38 0.91 0.29
Black 0.12 0.33 0.06 0.23
Asian 0.04 0.19 0.02 0.15
US born 0.86 0.35 0.95 0.22
Naturalized citizen 0.06 0.24 0.02 0.16
Foreign born, non-citizen 0.08 0.27 0.03 0.16
No HS diploma/GED 0.11 0.31 0.07 0.26
HS diploma/GED, no Bachelor’s 0.56 0.50 0.62 0.48
Bachelor’s degree 0.33 0.47 0.31 0.46
Households Characteristics:
Outcomes:
Trouble paying rent 0.15 0.36 0.14 0.34
Worried food won’t last 0.22 0.42 0.21 0.41
Lacked food 0.18 0.39 0.18 0.38
Cut meals 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.33
Cut phone service 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.23
Any family hardship 0.32 0.46 0.29 0.45
Controls:
Household income 58,965 44,001 63,541 46,808
Received food stamps in the past year 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.28
Owns a car 0.87 0.33 0.94 0.24
Homeownership 0.70 0.55 0.80 0.51
Source: Author’s calculations from the National Survey of America’s Families
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Table III.2: County summary statistics
No access Title Loan Access
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
County Characteristics:
Population 295,510 199,262 397,594 488,806
Unemployment rate 4.42 1.56 5.69 3.30
Percent urban 0.94 0.06 0.92 0.07
Per capita income 37,769 9,423 27,991 7,955
Percent male 48.71 0.91 49.36 0.98
Median age 35.8 2.73 34.28 4.05
Source: Author’s calculations from data from the Bureau of La-
bor Statistics and the Census Bureau.
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Table III.3: Main specification
Panel A: Individual Outcomes
Delay medical care Delay dental care Delay medication purchase Delay any care
TLAccess 0.0000310 0.00788 -0.0000913 0.00592
(0.00384) (0.00961) (0.00528) (0.00822)
N 67967 67967 67967 67967
adj. R-sq 0.027 0.034 0.023 0.040
Panel B: Household Outcomes
Trouble paying rent Worried food won’t last Lacked food Cut meals Cut phone service Any family hardship
TLAccess 0.00478 0.00524 -0.00158 -0.00452 0.00849 0.00186
(0.00627) (0.00656) (0.00499) (0.00561) (0.00440) (0.00693)
N 61089 60808 60793 60834 59666 61554
adj. R-sq 0.103 0.207 0.194 0.115 0.072 0.231
Notes: This table presents OLS estimates for regressions of each hardship outcome on title loan access and county and individual or household
controls. County controls are county population and cubics in county median income and percent urban. Individual level controls are house-
hold income, number of family members, homeownership status, past year unemployment spell, age, sex, race, ethnicity, immigration status,
and highest education level completed. Household level controls include household income, number of family members, homeownership sta-
tus, past year unemployment spell (any adult in the family), average age of adults, race (all white, all black, all Asian, mixed race), immigration
status (dummy for all foreign born), and education of the most educated adult. Each regression includes state-by-year fixed effects. Standard
errors, clustered at the county level, are reported in parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.00
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Table III.4: Probit regresisons
Panel A: Individual Outcomes
Delay medical care Delay dental care Delay medication purchase Delay any care
TLAccess -0.0318 -0.00785 -0.0338 -0.0221
(0.0500) (0.0500) (0.0738) (0.0486)
N 66152 66152 66152 66152
Panel B: Household Outcomes
Trouble paying rent Worried food won’t last Lacked food Cut meals Cut phone service Any family hardship
TLAccess 0.0185 0.0151 -0.0127 -0.0325 0.0880* 0.00422
(0.0292) (0.0285) (0.0240) (0.0332) (0.0407) (0.0255)
N 61089 60807 60792 60833 59665 61554
Notes: This table presents probit coefficients for regressions of each hardship outcome on title loan access and county and individual or house-
hold controls. County controls are county population and cubics in county median income and percent urban. Individual level controls are
household income, number of family members, homeownership status, past year unemployment spell, age, sex, race, ethnicity, immigration
status, and highest education level completed. Household level controls include household income, number of family members, homeowner-
ship status, past year unemployment spell (any adult in the family), average age of adults, race (all white, all black, all Asian, mixed race),
immigration status (dummy for all foreign born), and education of the most educated adult. Each regression includes state-by-year fixed ef-
fects. Standard errors, clustered at the county level, are reported in parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.00
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Table III.5: Sample limited to counties within 50 miles of a state border
Panel A: Individual Outcomes
Delay medical care Delay dental care Delay medication purchase Delay any care
TLAccess -0.00531 0.0152 -0.0125 -0.000287
(0.00696) (0.0116) (0.00740) (0.0112)
N 28145 28145 28145 28145
adj. R-sq 0.025 0.033 0.020 0.039
Panel B: Household Outcomes
Trouble paying rent Worried food won’t last Lacked food Cut meals Cut phone service Any family hardship
TLAccess 0.0130 0.0184* 0.00152 0.00319 0.0157** 0.0158
(0.00992) (0.00902) (0.00878) (0.00866) (0.00495) (0.00861)
N 24219 24219 24219 24219 24219 24219
adj. R-sq 0.097 0.205 0.184 0.107 0.075 0.234
Notes: This table presents OLS estimates for regressions of each hardship outcome on title loan access and county and individual or house-
hold controls for counties within 50 miles of a state that allows title lending. County controls are county population and cubics in county
median income and percent urban. Individual level controls are household income, number of family members, homeownership status, past
year unemployment spell, age, sex, race, ethnicity, immigration status, and highest education level completed. Household level controls in-
clude household income, number of family members, homeownership status, past year unemployment spell (any adult in the family), average
age of adults, race (all white, all black, all Asian, mixed race), immigration status (dummy for all foreign born), and education of the most ed-
ucated adult. Each regression includes state-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered at the county level, are reported in parentheses. *
p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
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Table III.6: Sample limited to middle 50% of age distribution
Delay medical care Delay dental care Delay medication purchase Delay any care
TLAccess -0.00655 0.0136 0.00407 0.0106
(0.00582) (0.00998) (0.00754) (0.00882)
N 39232 39232 39232 39232
adj. R-sq 0.034 0.041 0.028 0.048
Notes: This table presents OLS estimates for regressions of each hardship outcome on title
loan access and county and individual controls. County controls are county population and
cubics in county median income and percent urban. Individual level controls are household
income, number of family members, homeownership status, past year unemployment spell,
age, sex, race, ethnicity, immigration status, and highest education level completed. Each
regression includes state-by-year fixed effects.Standard errors, clustered at the county level,
are reported in parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Notes: This table presents OLS estimates for regressions of each hardship outcome on title loan
access and county and individual controls. County controls are county population and cubics
in county median income and percent urban. Individual level controls are household income,
number of family members, homeownership status, past year unemployment spell, age, sex,
race, ethnicity, immigration status, and highest education level completed. Each regression in-
cludes state-by-year fixed effects.Standard errors, clustered at the county level, are reported in
parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
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Table III.7: Sample limited to households in bottom 50% of income
Panel A: Individual Outcomes
Delay medical care Delay dental care Delay medication purchase Delay any care
TLAccess -0.00515 0.0106 -0.00974 -0.000948
(0.00461) (0.0144) (0.00752) (0.0136)
N 36769 36769 36769 36769
adj. R-sq 0.031 0.032 0.019 0.040
Panel B: Household Outcomes
Trouble paying rent Worried food won’t last Lacked food Cut meals Cut phone service Any family hardship
TLAccess 0.0127 0.00684 -0.00455 -0.00396 0.0130 0.00852
(0.0120) (0.0110) (0.00937) (0.00918) (0.00672) (0.00978)
N 31832 31832 31832 31832 31832 31832
adj. R-sq 0.060 0.116 0.110 0.058 0.056 0.134
Notes: This table presents OLS estimates for regressions of each hardship outcome on title loan access and county and individual or household
controls for households in the bottom 50% of the income distribution in the NSAF survey. County controls are county population and cubics in
county median income and percent urban. Individual level controls are household income, number of family members, homeownership status,
past year unemployment spell, age, sex, race, ethnicity, immigration status, and highest education level completed. Household level controls
include household income, number of family members, homeownership status, past year unemployment spell (any adult in the family), aver-
age age of adults, race (all white, all black, all Asian, mixed race), immigration status (dummy for all foreign born), and education of the most
educated adult. Each regression includes state-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered at the county level, are reported in parentheses.
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
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Table III.8: Sample limited to households with income below $25,000
Panel A: Individual Outcomes
Delay medical care Delay dental care Delay medication purchase Delay any care
TLAccess 0.00518 0.0267* -0.0178 0.00580
(0.0101) (0.0131) (0.00999) (0.0136)
N 19357 19357 19357 19357
adj. R-sq 0.037 0.039 0.020 0.049
Panel B: Household Outcomes
Trouble paying rent Worried food won’t last Lacked food Cut meals Cut phone service Any family hardship
TLAccess 0.0209 0.0242 -0.00107 -0.0105 0.0155 0.0198
(0.0146) (0.0137) (0.0141) (0.0135) (0.0136) (0.0145)
N 16164 16164 16164 16164 16164 16164
adj. R-sq 0.046 0.089 0.080 0.039 0.052 0.103
in annual income. County controls are county population and cubics in county median income and percent urban. Individual level controls are
household income, number of family members, homeownership status, past year unemployment spell, age, sex, race, ethnicity, immigration
status, and highest education level completed. Household level controls include household income, number of family members, homeowner-
ship status, past year unemployment spell (any adult in the family), average age of adults, race (all white, all black, all Asian, mixed race),
immigration status (dummy for all foreign born), and education of the most educated adult. Each regression includes state-by-year fixed ef-
fects. Standard errors, clustered at the county level, are reported in parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
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Table III.9: Sample limited to households who own a car
Panel A: Individual Outcomes
Delay medical care Delay dental care Delay medication purchase Delay any care
TLAccess -0.00211 0.00289 -0.00350 0.00152
(0.00458) (0.0101) (0.00515) (0.00885)
N 56888 56888 56888 56888
adj. R-sq 0.029 0.038 0.025 0.044
Panel B: Household Outcomes
Trouble paying rent Worried food won’t last Lacked food Cut meals Cut phone service Any family hardship
TLAccess 0.00592 0.00131 -0.00767 -0.0113 0.00642 -0.000399
(0.00620) (0.00698) (0.00641) (0.00649) (0.00476) (0.00831)
N 45835 45835 45835 45835 45835 45835
adj. R-sq 0.096 0.174 0.155 0.098 0.060 0.202
Notes: This table presents OLS estimates for regressions of each hardship outcome on title loan access and county and individual or household
controls for households who own a vehicle. County controls are county population and cubics in county median income and percent urban.
Individual level controls are household income, number of family members, homeownership status, past year unemployment spell, age, sex,
race, ethnicity, immigration status, and highest education level completed. Household level controls include household income, number of fam-
ily members, homeownership status, past year unemployment spell (any adult in the family), average age of adults, race (all white, all black,
all Asian, mixed race), immigration status (dummy for all foreign born), and education of the most educated adult. Each regression includes
state-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered at the county level, are reported in parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
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Table III.10: Sample limited to households who do not own a car
Panel A: Individual Outcomes
Delay medical care Delay dental care Delay medication purchase Delay any care
TLAccess 0.0200 0.0149 0.0156 0.0201
(0.0144) (0.0226) (0.0154) (0.0231)
N 9264 9264 9264 9264
adj. R-sq 0.032 0.027 0.016 0.038
Panel B: Household Outcomes
Trouble paying rent Worried food won’t last Lacked food Cut meals Cut phone service Any family hardship
TLAccess 0.0500* 0.0217 0.00423 0.0152 -0.00468 0.00885
(0.0206) (0.0257) (0.0225) (0.0259) (0.0212) (0.0253)
N 7112 7112 7112 7112 7112 7112
adj. R-sq 0.051 0.112 0.110 0.057 0.052 0.139
Notes: This table presents OLS estimates for regressions of each hardship outcome on title loan access and county and individual or household
controls for households who do not own a vehicle. County controls are county population and cubics in county median income and percent
urban. Individual level controls are household income, number of family members, homeownership status, past year unemployment spell, age,
sex, race, ethnicity, immigration status, and highest education level completed. Household level controls include household income, number of
family members, homeownership status, past year unemployment spell (any adult in the family), average age of adults, race (all white, all black,
all Asian, mixed race), immigration status (dummy for all foreign born), and education of the most educated adult. Each regression includes
state-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered at the county level, are reported in parentheses. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
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Appendix
History of title lending
In this appendix, I summarize the history of title lending in each state. I include infor-
mation on legislation that affects title loans, and reports of the existence of the loans in a
state. I include both because title lending grew out of pawnbroking, and title lenders often
operated in a state before any specific title lending regulation.
Alabama
In Alabama, title loans are regulated under the pawn lending statue, which was passed in
1992.14 In 1993, the Alabama Supreme Court ruled that title loans are pawn transactions
and are covered under the this statue.15 Title lenders operate in Alabama throughout the
entire time period.
Alaska
While title loans are not explicitly banned under Alaska state law, they are effectively
banned by a strict cap on interest rates, last changed in 1982.16 This cap represents an
annualized interest rate of less than 36 percent for loans up to $10,000, so lenders do not
operate in the state.
Arizona
The earliest mention of title lending in Arizona is in a Wall Street Journal article that
states that consumer advocates tried to ban the loans as early as 1997. Arizona specifically
authorized title lending in 2000, under the Motor Vehicle Time Sales Disclosure Act.17
Title lenders have operated in the state throughout the period of study.
Arkansas
Arkansas’s Constitution has a provision limiting interest rates charged by non-FDIC in-
sured lenders to 17 percent.18 Nevertheless, title lenders operated in the state in the mid-
and late-1990s, charging interest rates above the legal cap. The Arkansas Supreme Court
ruled in 1999 that this was not legal.19 Title lenders have not operated in the state since
then.
14Ala. Code Ann. §5-19A
15Floyd v. Title Exch. & Pawn, Inc., 620 So. 2d 576, 579 (Ala. 1993)
16Alaska Stat. §06.20.230
17Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §44-281
18The original constitutional cap was repealed in 2011, but the interest rap cap for non-FDIC insured
lenders did not change. Ark. Const. art XIX, §13 (repealed 2011), Ark. Const. Amend. 89 §3
19State of Ark. v R A Investment.,336 Ark. at 295, 785 S.W 2d
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California
The first title lender opened in 1995, according to the San Francisco Chronicle. In Cali-
fornia, title lenders operate under the California Finance Lenders Law, which authorizes
lenders to charge high interest rates on loans larger than $2,500.20
Colorado
In Colorado, title loans are not explicitly authorized by law. The state has an interest rate
cap of 45 percent, passed in 1989 unless a higher interest rate is separately authorized by
another statue.21 This means that title lenders do not operate in the state over the period of
study.
Connecticut
Connecticut has an interest rate cap of 12 percent, last amended in 1996, unless otherwise
authorized by law.22 Because title loans are not explicitly authorized by law, title lenders
do not operate in the state.
Delaware
The earliest record of title lending in Delaware is from a 2001 Delaware Capital Review
article. Delaware does not have a strict interest rate cap, and so lenders could charge any
interest rate. Delaware explicitly authorized title lending in a separate statute in 2009.23
Florida
Florida was one of the first state to have title loans. In 1995, the state passed a bill authoriz-
ing the lenders to charge up to 264 percent per annum.24 In 2000, the legislature passed a
law capping title lending rates at 30 percent per annum.25 Title lenders almost completely
shut down in the state following the interest rate restriction.
Georgia
The earliest mention of title lending in Georgia that I found was from a 1996 Florida Times
Union article comparing title lending in Florida and Georgia. Georgia explicitly states that
title loans are covered under the pawnbroking statue.26 Title lenders have existed in the
state throughout the time period of study.
Hawai’i
Hawaii has an interest rate cap of 24 percent per annum, passed in 1993.27 Because of this,
title lenders do not operate in the state.
2010 C.C.R. §1404
21Colo. Rev. Stat §18-15-104(1)
22Conn. Gen. Stat. §37-4
23Del. Code Ann. Title 5 §2250
24Fla. Stat §538.06(5)(e), repealed
25Fla. Stat. 537.011(1)
26 GA Code Ann. §44-12-131
27 Haw. Rev. Stat §412:9-302
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Idaho
The first mention of title lending in Idaho that I found was a May 1999 Wall Street Journal
article. The article noted that title lenders had recently began operating in the state. Idaho
passed an explicit title lending statute in 2006.28 Title lenders have operated in the state
throughout the period of study.
Illinois
A Wall Street Journal article from May, 1999 states that title lenders have operated in
Illinois for two years. The state passed specific title lending legislation in 2009.29 Title
lenders have operated throughout the entire period of study.
Indiana
Indiana has an interest rate cap of 36 percent per annum, first passed in 1982.30 Title
lenders did not operate in the state during the period of study.
Iowa
The earliest mention of title lending in Iowa I found is a 2005 Des Moines City View
article. The article mentions that title lenders began operating in 2004 in the state. In
2007, the interest that title lenders can charge was capped at 21 percent per annum.31 This
effectively shut down the title lending industry in Iowa.
Kansas
Title lenders began operating in Kansas in 2004 (Fox and Guy, 2005). The lenders operated
under the open ended credit statute to circumvent strict interest rate caps on small loans.32
Kentucky
Kentucky was one of the first states to prohibit title lending through a strict interest rate
cap. The state passed a 3 percent monthly interest rate cap in 1998.33 Title lenders stop
operating in the state after the interest rate cap.
Louisiana
Louisiana passed a law prohibiting “title only” pawns in 1993.34 This law outlawed title
loans in the state before the time period under study here. Title lenders do not operate in
the state.
28Idaho Code Ann. 28-46
29Ill. Admin. Code. tit 38 §110.300
30Ind. Code Ann. §24-4.5-3-508
31Iowa Code Ann. 537.2403
32Kan. Stat. Ann. §16a-2-202(1)
33KY Rev. Stat. Ann. 286.4-530
34LA Rev. Stat. Ann. §37:1801
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Maine
Title loans are explicitly banned in Maine. The law was passed in 1997, so the loans have
been prohibited throughout the time period under study here.35
Maryland
Title loans are not explicitly authorized in Maryland, and there is a strict interest rate cap for
small-dollar loans, last amended in 1983, with an annualized rate of less than 36 percent.36
Hence, title lenders do not operate in the state.
Massachusetts
Massachusetts has a strict interest rate cap of 20 percent pen annum, passed in 1971, unless
otherwise authorized by law.37 This means that title lenders do not operate in the state.
Michigan
Michigan has a general interest rate cap of 25 percent pen annum, passed in 1968.38 There-
fore title lenders do not operate in the state over the time period studied.
Minnesota
In Minnesota, title loans are explicitly authorized as a pawn transaction, but the interest rate
in capped at 3 percent monthly.39 Because of this, title lenders do not operate in the state.
The law was passed in 1996, and so title loans do not exist in the state during the period of
study.
Mississippi
In 1997, Mississippi passed the Title Pledge Act, which explicitly authorized title loans in
the state.40 Title lenders operate in the state throughout the entire time period.
Missouri
According to the Kansas City Star, title loans first appeared in Missouri in 1998. Currently,
the title loans are regulated under separate regulations, also passed in 1998.41 Title lenders
have operated in the state throughout the entire period of study.
Montana
Lundberg (2007) provides a detailed history of title lending in Montana. In 2001, the
legislature passed the Title Lending Act, which authorized interest rates up to 25 percent
per month. Title lenders operated in the state until 2011, when the Montana Loan Interest
35Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 30-A, §3960
36MD Code Ann. Com. Law §12-306
37Mass. Gen. Law Ann. Ch.271 §49.
38Mich. Comp. Laws §438.41
39Minn. Stat. §325J.095
40Miss. Code Ann. §75-67-413
41Mo. Rev. Stat. §367.515
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Rate Limit Act was enacted. This act capped title loan interest rates at 36 percent per
annum.42 The interest rate cap on title loans was repealed in 2013, and title lenders were
once again allowed to charge triple digit interest rates, starting December 31, 2013. This is
after the end of the period of study here.
Nebraska
Nebraska limits interest rates at a maximum of 24 percent pen annum for small-dollar
loans.43 This law effectively prevents title lenders from operating over the entire period of
study.
Nevada
The earliest mention of title lending in Nevada that I found was from a 1996 Florida Times
Union article on the debate about title loans in Florida. Initially, the lenders operate under
the pawnbroking statute.44 In 2005, Nevada passed a law explicitly authorizing title loans
that places no cap on the interest rate charged.45 Title lenders have operated in Nevada
throughout the whole period of study.
New Hampshire
According to the New Hampshire Business Review, title lenders first appeared in New
Hampshire in 2000, following the lifting of the strict interest rate cap. In 2009, rates on
title loans were capped at 36 percent per annum.46 The industry effectively shut down after
this interest rate cap. The law was again changed in March 2012, allowing interest rates up
to 25 percent per month.47 According to the Concord Monitor, title lenders reentered the
state quickly after the rate increase.
New Jersey
New Jersey has a strict interest rate cap of 30 percent per annum for noncommercial loans,
originally passed in 1979.48 This effectively prohibits title lenders from operating in the
state.
New Mexico
The earliest mention of title lending in New Mexico that I found was a May 1999 Wall
Street Journal article that states that title lenders recently set up in the state. I date this as
1998. The lenders operate under the Small Business Loan statute, which places very few
restrictions on lenders.49
42Mont. Code. Ann. 31-1-817, repealed
43Neb. Rev. Stat. §45-103
44Nev. Rev. Stat. §646.050
45Nev. Rev. Stat. §604A.105
46N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §399-A:14, repealed
47N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §399-A:14.VI
48N.J. Rev. Stat. §2C:21-19
49N.M. Stat. Ann. §58-15-23
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New York
New York has a strict interest rate cap of 25 percent per annum, unless explicitly authorized
by another statue.50 Title lenders do not operate in the state.
North Carolina
North Carolina has a strict interest rate cap, which has been in place since 1979.51 Title
lenders do not operate in the state.
North Dakota
North Dakota has a strict interest rate cap, first enacted in 1890.52 Title lenders do not
operate in the state.
Ohio
According to the Dayton Daily News, title lenders began operating in Ohio in 2012. They
operate under either the Ohio Second Mortgage Loan Act53 or the Credit Service Organi-
zation Act54 (Rothstein, 2012). Before 2012, they did not operate in the state.
Oklahoma
Oklahoma has a strict interest rate cap of 10 percent per annum, enacted in 1969.55 Title
lenders do not operate in the state.
Oregon
The Wall Street Journal article on title lending states that title lenders first started operating
in 1997. The state capped the interest rate on title loans at 36 percent per annum in 2007,
effectively shutting down the industry.56
Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania has a strict interest rate cap of 36 percent per annum, first enacted in 1972.57
Title lenders do not operate in the state.
Rhode Island
Rhode Island has a strict interest rate of 24 percent per annum on loans under $5,000,58
and 21 percent per annum for on loans over $5,000.59 Tittle lenders do not operate in the
state.
50NY Penal Law §190.40
51N.C. Gen. Stat. §24-1.1
52N.D. Cent. Code §47-14-09
53Oh. Rev. Stat. §1301:8-3
54Oh. Rev. Stat. §4712
55Okla. Stat. tit. 14 §14A-3-201
56Or. Rev. Stat. §725.615. The statute was renumbered in 2010 as §725A.062
5718 PA. Stat. Ann. §4806.1(h)
58R.I. Gen. Laws §19-14.2-8, passed in 1995
59R.I. Gen. Laws §6-26-2, originally passed in 1909
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South Carolina
Title lenders first operated in South Carolina without specific legislation. A Wall Street
Journal article from 1999 mentions that they have operated for a few years in the state. In
2003, the state passed specific title lending legislation.60
South Dakota
In South Dakota, title lenders operated for years without an explicit title loan statute. The
state, however, did require all lenders to be licensed. The first license issued for a company
that is clearly a title lender was issued in October 1998.61 In 2006, South Dakota added
title lenders to its money lending license statute.62 Title lenders have operated in the state
throughout the period of study.
Tennessee
Tennessee passed the Title Pledge Act in 1995, explicitly authorizing title loans and setting
the maximum interest rate at 264 percent per annum.63 Title lenders have operated in the
state throughout the whole period of study.
Texas
In Texas, legislation restricting the interest charges that title lenders could charge was en-
acted in 1999.64 Since that time, title lenders operate as credit service organizations (CSO)
to avoid the interest rate cap for small-dollar loans.65 Title lenders have operated in the
state throughout the entire time period of study.
Utah
Utah does not have an interest rate cap and so title lenders have existed in the state since the
mid 1990s. Utah passed the Title Lending Registration Act in 2003, explicitly authorizing
title loans.66 They existed in the state throughout the entire period of study.
Vermont
Vermont has a string interest rate cap of 20 percent per annum, first enacted in 1979 and
last amended in 1995.67 Title lenders do not operate in the state.
Virginia
The earliest mention of title lending in Virginia that I found was a Virginian Pilot article
that stated they existed in 2005. In September 2010, a law regulating title lenders went
into effect. The law capped interest rates in the triple digits; limited the number of times
60S.C. Code Ann. §37-3-413
61List of licensees available from http://dlr.sd.gov/banking/money lenders.aspx
62S.D. Co. Laws §54-4-36
63Tenn. Code Ann. §45-15-111
64Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 342.252-252
65Tex. Fin. Code Ann. §393.201
66Utah Code Ann. §7-24
67VT Sta. Ann. tit. 9 §41a(b)(4)
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a person could roll over the loan; stated that the company must return excess proceeds of
any vehicle sales; and prohibited loans to out of state borrowers.68 In early 2011, the ban
on loans to out of state drivers was lifted, but the other provisions remained in effect. Title
lenders have operated in the state since 2005.
Washington
Washington has a strict interest rate cap of 25 percent per annum for small lenders, first
enacted in 1991.69 Title lenders do not operate in the state.
Washington, D.C.
Washington, D.C. has a strict interest rate cap of 24 percent per annum.70 Title lenders do
not operate in the district.
West Virginia
West Virginia has a strict interest rate cap of 31 percent per annum, first passed in 1974.In
the mid 1990s, title lenders operated under the pawnbroking statute,71 which does not
contain the same interest rate cap. In 1997, however, the West Virginia Supreme Court
ruled that title loans are not covered under the pawnbroking statute.72 Since 1997, title
lenders have not operated in the state.
Wisconsin
According to the Madison Capital Times, title lending first appeared in Wisconsin in 1999.
The Wisconsin legislature passed legislation authorizing title loans in 2010, to take effect
on January 1, 2011. Gov. Jim Doyle struck the authorization of title loans from the bill
using his veto power, but the provision was reintroduced in 2011 budget, and Gov. Scott
Walker did not veto the provision. Since Jun 2011, title lending is explicitly authorized in
Wisconsin.73 Title lenders operated from 1999 to present, except for the first 6 months of
2011.
Wyoming
Wyoming has a strict interest rate cap of 36 percent per annum.74 Title lenders did not
operate in the state during the period of study.
68Va. Code Ann. §6.2-2200 and seq.
69Wash. Rev. Code Ann. 31.04.105. Payday loans are regulated separately and are allowed to charge
more.
70D.C. Code §28-3301(a)
71W. Va. Code Ann. 46A-4-107
72State ex rel. McGraw v. Pawn America, 518 S.E.2d 859 (W.Va. 1998)
73Wis. Stat. §138.16
74Wyo. Stat. Ann. §40-14-348
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